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Abstract 
 
 
 From the Bolshevik Revolution to the Brexit Vote, the covert world of 
intelligence has attempted to influence global events with varying degrees of success. In 
2016, one of the most brazen manifestations of Russian intelligence operations was 
directed against millions of Americans when they voted to elect a new president. 
Although this was not the first time that Russia attempted to influence an American 
presidential election, it was undoubtedly the largest attempt in terms of its scope and the 
most publicized to date. Although much discussion has followed the 2016 election, there 
have not been much concerted historical analysis which situates the events of 2016 within 
the global timeline of foreign intelligence collection. This paper argues that the onset of 
social media has altered intelligence collection in terms of its form, but not in terms of its 
essence. Using the case study method, this paper illustrates how three different nations 
apply classical intelligence techniques to the modern environment of social media. This 
paper examines how China has utilized classical agent recruitment techniques through 
sites like LinkedIn, how Iran has used classical honey trap techniques through a 
combination of social media sites, and how Russia has employed the classical tactics of 
kompromat, forgery, agents of influence and front groups in its modern covert influence 
campaigns. This paper’s case study analysis highlights the importance of bringing 
historical perspectives into the current discussion of digital intelligence operations. 
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Intelligence Terms and Acronyms 
 
 
active measures: a wide array of overt and covert activities designed to influence a 
group of people 
 
agent: a human intelligence source who is recruited by and works on behalf of an 
intelligence agency 
 
agent of influence: a witting or unwitting person who is used by an intelligence agency 
to exert influence over a person or group of persons 
 
front group: a group established and controlled by an intelligence agency  
 
handler: an intelligence officer responsible for the recruitment and handling of human 
assets 
 
honey trap: the use of an attractive person to approach an intelligence target and collect 
information 
 
kompromat: comprising material (either real or fabricated) that is published in order to 
create negative publicity for an individual  
 
HUMINT: Human intelligence or intelligence that is collected from recruited human 
assets 
 
OSINT: the collection of publicly available information which analyzed and 
contextualized in order to bring value to an intelligence agency’s customers 
 
social media: forms of electronic communication (including websites and mobile 
applications) through which users create and join online communities to share 
information, ideas and various forms of digital content 
 
tradecraft: the techniques, technologies and specialized methods employed in 
intelligence collection and analysis 
 
USIC: the United States Intelligence Community, comprised of seventeen US 
government agencies 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
 In 2016, the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) reported that Russia’s 
intelligence services attempted to influence the 2016 presidential election by targeting 
millions of Americans through a disinformation campaign on multiple social media 
platforms. Converting popular social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter into 
tools used to wage an election interference campaign against the United States was in 
some respects a novel strategy. Yet a thorough comparative analysis of this election 
interference campaign and the Soviet Union’s covert influence operations during the 
Cold War suggests Russian intelligence had merely adapted the Soviet model for waging 
malign influence campaigns. Meanwhile, Russia is not the only state actor that has used 
social media to manipulate a foreign population. Notable attempts to use popular social 
media platforms to wage covert influence operations have also recently been attributed to 
Iranian and Chinese intelligence services. As these actors clearly view popular social 
media platforms as attractive tools that may be used to wage influence operations, it is 
necessary to consider ways to build resiliency against these activities. Refining current 
understanding of how social media may be used by these and other actors to update 
traditional intelligence operations among governments, the private sector, and civilian 
populations can help to achieve this objective.  
The aim of this paper is to answer the question of which classical intelligence 
techniques are favored by specific foreign intelligence agencies when they employ social 
media as a weapon. In order to accomplish this aim, its author has examined relevant 
literature, and performed case study analysis of foreign intelligence operations conducted 
by Russia, Iran and China. 
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A section focused on Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 United States 
presidential election considers how Russian intelligence services employed well-known 
intelligence techniques that were once utilized by the Soviet Union. A section focused on 
Iranian regime’s activities in the cyber domain examines the Islamic Republic’s steadily 
expanding online covert influence campaigns, which indicate Iranian intelligence services 
favor the use of digital honey traps. A section focused on China’s online intelligence 
operations examines how Chinese spies have developed expertise with generating 
personal introductions online that have resulted in successful agent recruitments.  
Meanwhile, this paper exposes how foreign intelligence agencies are taking 
advantage of sociological changes caused by the digital environment, and social media in 
particular, to expand their capabilities to wage large-scale influence operations, as well as 
to recruit new assets.  
  Since its onset in the 1990s, social media has quickly become inextricable from 
contemporary interpersonal interaction. Although numerous researchers have explored 
social media’s general effects on interpersonal communication, few researchers have 
addressed questions about how social media has affected the field of intelligence 
collection. 
Significance of the Topic 
Foreign intelligence agencies and foreign intelligence entities (or FIEs, which also 
includes international terrorist groups) have employed social media and other digital tools 
to gain access to businesses, governments, and individuals. As Russia’s infamous 
influence campaign of 2016 illustrated, social media allows FIEs to directly access a 
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larger segment of the general population in the United States than FIEs were capable 
interacting with during the Twentieth Century. 
 In its 2019 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) observed:  
 
Rapid technological advances are allowing a broad range of FIEs to field 
increasingly sophisticated capabilities and aggressively target the 
government, private sector partners, and academia. FIEs are proactive and 
use creative approaches—including the use of cyber tools, malicious 
insiders, espionage, and supply chain exploitation—to advance their 
interests and gain advantage over the United States. These activities 
intensify traditional FIE threats...1  
 
Private firms within the information technology security sector seem to agree with 
ODNI’s assessment regarding foreign intelligence agencies’ weaponization of social 
media and increasing reliance on cyber tools. Cyber security firm FireEye assessed that, 
“Nations across the globe are putting a premium on improving their cyber capabilities,” 
which often includes tapping into the social networks of cyber criminals and the 
utilization of commercially available cyber tools.2 In reference to Iran’s growing cyber 
program, cyber security firm F-Secure has urged media organizations and platforms to 
                                                 
1 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States, 
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2019, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/National_Intelligence_Strategy_2019.pdf. 
2 Sarah Geary, “Rise of the Rest: APT Groups No Longer from Just China and Russia,” FireEye (blog), 
April 26, 2018, 
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2018/04/rise-of-the-rest-apt-groups-no-longer-from-
just-china-and-russia.html. 
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“consider the specific risks posed by state actors involved in cyber-attack and abuse of 
native product functionality.”3 FireEye recently assessed that Iran created a network of 
fake social media personas which “impersonated Republican political candidates that ran 
for House of Representatives seats in the 2018 U.S. congressional midterms.”4 In March 
of 2019, cyber threat intelligence firm RecordedFuture released a report which analyzed 
data from various Western social media platforms from October 2018 through February 
2019 to assess ways in which China exploits social media to influence the American 
public.5 The firm’s researchers concluded that China’s covert influence techniques differ 
greatly from those of Russia. Namely, while Russian covert influence agents aggressively 
attack and detract from adversaries via social media, Chinese covert influence personas 
“overwhelmingly present a positive, benign, and cooperative image of China” and opt for 
more of a softer and diplomatic approach in order to achieve China’s specific foreign 
policy goals.6  
Within the public sector, various government agencies are reaching out to private 
sector entities in order to develop a collective strategic understanding of the adversary 
behind these threats. In 2017, the FBI created an Office of Private Sector (OPS) which 
seeks to proactively reach out to owners of America’s privately held infrastructure and 
                                                 
3 Ed Parsons and George Michael, “Understanding the Cyber Threat from Iran,” F-Secure, (accessed 
November 24, 2019), https://www.f-secure.com/en/consulting/our-thinking/understanding-the-cyber-threat-
from-iran. 
4 Alice Revelli and Lee Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political 
Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests,” FireEye (blog), May 28, 
2019, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/05/social-media-network-impersonates-us-
political-candidates-supports-iranian-interests.html. 
5 Insikt Group, “Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits Social Media to Sway American Opinion,” 
RecordedFuture, March 6, 2019, https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations/. 
6 Ibid. 
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address the threats which stem from this privately held infrastructure.7 At the 2019 RSA 
Conference, FBI Director Christopher Wray highlighted how public and private sector 
engagement of cyber threats can be mutually beneficial, citing the FBI’s efforts to reach 
out to social media providers leading up to the 2018 midterm elections.8 Cyber Command 
has also extended public invitations to engage on countering the cyber threat to American 
citizens and infrastructure.9 In December 2017, Jeanette Manfra, assistant secretary for 
the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications at the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) announced that DHS was seeking to “to move beyond only offering 
voluntary assistance” to the American private sector by increasing the use of proactive 
memoranda of agreement in advance of cyber-related threats to public security.10 The 
Cyber security firm FireEye believes that regardless of the malicious cyber activity, 
“Understanding the adversary is the key to protecting against attacks because, while you 
can’t foresee all attacks, you can at least use intelligence from the past to inform possible 
future assaults and help mitigate consequences. Consuming adversary intelligence is 
important to enterprises because in order to protect yourself, you need to know both who 
will come after you and how they will come after you.”11 
As noted in ODNI’s NIS, the top mission priority for the US Intelligence 
Community is to collect “strategic intelligence” or in other words, to collect intelligence 
                                                 
7 “Enhancing Engagement Efforts to Stay Ahead of the Threat,” FBI, February 2, 2017, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/office-of-private-sector. 
8 “Wray Stresses Private Sector-FBI Collaboration Against Cyberthreats,” Meritalk, March 6, 2019, 
https://www.meritalk.com/articles/wray-stresses-private-sector-fbi-collaboration-against-cyberthreats/. 
9 Justin Lynch, “Cyber Command wants to partner with private sector to stop hacks,” Fifth Domain, July 
21, 2018, https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2018/07/31/cyber-command-wants-to-partner-with-
private-sector-to-stop-hacks/. 
10 Derek B. Johnson, “DHS plans to step up cyber agreements with private companies,” Federal Computer 
Week, December 21, 2017, https://fcw.com/articles/2017/12/21/section9-dhs-cyber-johnson.aspx. 
11 Adam Meyers, “Meet the Advanced Persistent Threats: List of Cyber Threat Actors,” FireEye, February 
24, 2019, https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-the-adversaries/. 
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which “addresses issues of enduring national security interest.”12 As the above examples 
illustrate, foreign intelligence agencies’ weaponization of social media and other digital 
tools remains an enduring national security interest. Therefore, it is critical for academic 
researchers to explore the classical strategies that inform new iterations of intelligence 
operations taking place in social media.  
If the classically influenced strategies behind social media intelligence operations 
escape critical examination, then there will likely be no changes to the inherent security 
structures within social media. It is promising that the US government is trying to be 
proactive in its outreach to private companies, but part of this should include an 
intelligence primer regarding the innerworkings and cultural heritage of the adversary. 
Without historical insight into how foreign intelligence agencies target citizens, public 
discussion will likely remain focused on the technical aspects of social media platforms 
themselves and not on the underlying motivations and tactics that have brought today’s 
foreign intelligence agencies to target digital citizens within the social media sphere. 
 The topic of foreign intelligence operations in social media offers researchers the 
opportunity to bring the historic activities of intelligence professionals into the broader 
public discussion. To date, much of the available information surrounding intelligence 
operations in social media has solely focused on their immediate effects as well as the 
emotional responses to them, rather than focusing on the histories and processes behind 
them. In order to produce more fruitful discussion around this topic, this paper will 
examine cases from past and recent foreign intelligence operations that will illuminate 
today’s expanded intelligence environment.  
                                                 
12 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States. 
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Main Theme and Chapter Themes  
The goal of this paper is to answer the question of how modern foreign 
intelligence agencies apply classical intelligence techniques to the modern sphere of 
social media. In order to answer this question, this paper will employ the method of case 
study and give the reader visibility into the historical influences on the strategies that are 
currently being used to influence American values, perceptions, and beliefs. Because 
intelligence operations often result in compelling narratives and are ultimately a series of 
interlinking processes, the case study method was chosen to examine this topic.  
To thematically divide the content of the following three chapters, each chapter 
will be devoted to one of America’s most notable intelligence adversaries. Specifically, 
this paper will examine the ways in which three of America’s foreign intelligence 
agencies (Russia, Iran and China) use social media to incorporate and enhance traditional 
foreign intelligence techniques in their modern operations. In terms of choosing which 
nations to study, these nations were chosen based on their high amount of publicly 
available information, the adversarial nation’s relevance to US foreign policy, and the 
nation’s consistent ranking as a US intelligence priority. Though many nations collect 
intelligence on the United States, the adversarial nations of Russia, Iran and China 
possess not only the intent, but also the proven capability to carry out sophisticated 
foreign intelligence campaigns through social media. For these reasons, Russia, Iran, and 
China were chosen as the nations for analysis within the following chapters. 
This paper is organized into this introductory chapter, three chapters of analysis, 
and a concluding chapter. Each of the following analytical chapters will center its case 
study narratives around a single country and then highlight a specific intelligence 
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technique which has been observed in modern social media operations carried out by the 
specific country. The ensuing chapters will perform this analysis by comparing two cases 
of intelligence operations for each country: one operation conducted during a pre- or 
nascent social media era, and one operation conducted in a post-social media 
environment. By performing this case study analysis, this paper will help researchers and 
members of the public better understand the current intelligence operational environment 
and provide a starting point for future intelligence research.  
The first chapter will explore the Russian technique of covert influence in the 
various forms it has taken when employed to target American voters during federal 
political elections. After reviewing relevant literature and providing historical 
background regarding Russia’s covert influence machinery, this chapter will compare 
two case studies of Russian electoral interference. The first case will examine Russia’s 
covert influence efforts directed against the 1984 US presidential election, and the second 
case will examine Russia’s covert influence efforts directed against the 2016 US 
presidential election. Comparative analysis of these cases will examine the common 
intelligence techniques utilized in these influence campaigns, with particular focus on 
how social media enabled Russian intelligence services to apply certain techniques to 
target specific segments of the American civilian populace in 2016. Suggestions for 
future research will conclude the study of Russia’s use of social media to pursue its 
foreign intelligence goals.  
The second chapter will explore Iran’s use of the honey trap technique. After 
providing information to familiarize the reader with the honey trap technique and the 
modern world of Iranian cyber operations, this chapter will compare two case studies: the 
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Iranian regime’s use of a real-life honey trap to lure prospective intelligence assets, in the 
form of defector Monica Witt, and Iranian intelligence’s use of a digital honey trap, in the 
form of the digital persona Mia Ash. Comparative analysis considers the declining risks 
to intelligence officials themselves when  employing digital honey traps versus 
employing human honey traps in more traditional HUMINT operations, thus the 
attractiveness of social media platforms that afford users anonymity for foreign 
intelligence services. This chapter will conclude with recommendations for future 
research into Iran’s weaponization of social media. 
The third chapter will explore what is arguably one of the most damaging 
intelligence activities conducted by Chinese intelligence: agent recruitment. First, this 
chapter will define relevant intelligence terms and provide historical insight into 
prototypical Chinese recruitment techniques. Next, this chapter will examine two agent 
recruitment operations conducted by Chinese intelligence services in before and after the 
rise of social media. The case of Chinese American Peter “Wen-Ho” Lee will serve as the 
first case study, and the case of former CIA case officer Kevin Mallory will serve as the 
second. Comparative analysis of these cases will show that social media significantly 
enhanced the recruitment process when Kevin Mallory was recruited through the 
professional networking site LinkedIn by enabling remote access to the target in a 
manner that was difficult for counterintelligence professionals immediately to detect. The 
case analysis will be followed by recommendations for future research of Chinese 
intelligence operations in social media.  
The following three analytical chapters will address ways in which one of 
America’s intelligence adversaries has enhanced a classical intelligence technique using 
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social media. Although this is a broad and complex issue, the case studies throughout the 
next three chapters have been chosen in order to properly highlight the most pertinent 
intelligence techniques that are characteristic of their respective nations.  
Situation of the Paper Among Existing Intelligence Research 
 Intelligence and national security studies research is a field that has become 
international in scope and increasingly diverse in its scholarly approaches. Due to the 
covert nature of many intelligence activities, there are many barriers to conducting 
studies of intelligence operations for security studies scholars performing unclassified 
research.  
While many barriers exist when it comes to publicly accessing classified 
intelligence, one subset of intelligence which should be mentioned when addressing 
intelligence operations in social media is the concept of open source intelligence 
(OSINT). When used by the Intelligence Community, OSINT is the collection of publicly 
available information which is synthesized and analyzed to contribute to finished 
intelligence products. OSINT has been a recognized subset of intelligence for some time, 
but in recent years, it has undergone several changes, mostly pertaining to the expansion 
of publicly available data and the ensuing need for a more concise definition of this 
intelligence practice.13 As publicly available data sources have expanded, some 
researchers have argued that the methodologies behind OSINT collection require more 
concise refinement as well.14 The collection of publicly available information from social 
media falls under the broad definition of OSINT. Much can be said about the intricacies 
                                                 
13 Heather J. Williams and Ilana Blum, Defining Second Generation Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) for 
the Defense Enterprise, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018, Accessed November 24, 2019, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1964.html. 
14 Ibid. 
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of open source research and how it has changed intelligence collection practices. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, the following chapters of analysis will primarily 
analyze specific traits and characteristics of social media as a single OSINT collection 
vector. 
Outside of OSINT, much of intelligence itself remains compartmented and 
distanced from academic and private sector researchers. In order to study this topic, the 
majority of intelligence researchers employ a historical or cultural approach. Researchers 
like Michael Warner,15 Mark Phythian16 and Christopher Andrew17 have produced 
extensive overviews of entire intelligence services using these approaches. Some 
intelligence agencies, like Britain’s MI-5, have granted seemingly unfettered access to 
their archives.18 In other cases, archival research takes the form of an ethnographic 
postmortem of fallen intelligence regimes. Katherine Verdery’s ethnographic research 
into Romania’s former Securitate took advantage of the fall of Romania’s Soviet-run 
security state and uncovered not merely the intelligence the Securitate had collected on 
her, but also files which revealed the inner-workings and social relations of Romania’s 
intelligence service.19  
Outside of legitimate access to intelligence archives, there are also instances 
where illegitimate access has increased the public’s cultural knowledge and awareness of 
how intelligence agencies operate. Although defectors vary in their degrees of access and 
                                                 
15 Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2014). 
16 Mark Phythian, Understanding the Intelligence Cycle (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2013). 
17 Christopher M. Andrew, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018). 
18 Harold Leigh, “The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 by Christopher Andrew,” 
Guardian, October 9, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/oct/10/defence-of-the-realm-mi5. 
19 Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography In the Archive of Romania's Secret Police, 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014). 
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reliability, it cannot be denied that intelligence researchers greatly benefit from the 
firsthand accounts of foreign defectors. Figures such as Vasili Mitrokhin, Litvinenko and 
Sergei Tretyakov, have all published valuable archives of classified information which 
have benefited researchers as well as the United States as a whole, sometimes leading to 
the discovery of vast spy networks as was the case with Tretyakov’s assistance in the 
expulsion of Russia’s illegals.20  
In addition to using historical and cultural approaches, some researchers approach 
the study of intelligence from a cross-disciplinary perspective. One cross-disciplinary 
approach to intelligence which some researchers have used is the examination of the 
psychology of spying and how this psychology has altered from a pre- to post-social 
media world.21 Other researchers have used a cyber research approach to examine the 
broad ways in which technology plays a role in America’s foreign intelligence 
collection.22  
Additionally, some technology researchers are starting to focus their efforts on 
social media in particular and the legalities of its role as a platform for US foreign 
intelligence collection.23 Notably, the vast majority of intelligence research which 
addresses social media’s role has a very American-centric focus. This may be due to the 
fact that America’s intelligence agencies are more widely known than others and also 
relatively transparent in terms of government oversight. The study of ethics in 
                                                 
20 Fred Weir, “Kremlin official issues death threat in Russian spy scandal. Is the KGB coming back?” 
CSMonitor, November 12, 2010, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1112/Kremlin-official-
issues-death-threat-in-Russian-spy-scandal.-Is-the-KGB-coming-back. 
21 Danielle A. Hayes, “The Trusted Insider: Motives, Behaviors, Fictions, and Digital Age 
Norms,” American Intelligence Journal 35, no. 2 (July 2018): 17–25. 
22 Candace N. Stevens, “Technology in Foreign Intelligence Gathering,” American Intelligence Journal 34, 
no. 1 (January 2017): 123–30. 
23 Steven C. Henricks, “Social Media, Publicly Available Information, and the Intelligence 
Community,” American Intelligence Journal 34, no. 1 (January 2017): 21–31. 
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intelligence and particularly, the ethics of social media intelligence collection and its 
possible regulation has also entered the discussion in American intelligence studies 
literature.24 However, as other nations detect what they believe to be interference in their 
elections and other domestic affairs, international publications of intelligence research 
with a social media focus is growing within this field of study.25 
 Regardless of which countries or agencies are studied, it is important that 
researchers continue to examine the central tenets of the intelligence profession through 
modern lenses. Namely, it is important for researchers to ask key questions regarding 
which quintessential aspects of this profession have changed and which practices have 
remained the same as intelligence operations have entered the digital sphere. Now that 
many spies have migrated their covert communications from secure landlines to 
encrypted messaging applications, it is important to examine which aspects of classical 
tradecraft inform today’s intelligence practitioners. Although many Americans are now 
aware that Russia and other nations collect massive amounts of information using online 
sources and methods, precisely what foreign intelligence agencies do with this 
information and how they use classical human targeting techniques are topics which 
necessitate further discussion. From a cultural perspective, it is important that researchers 
consider which digital intelligence techniques are unique to the American experience, 
which techniques apply to other nations, and which techniques are universal. 
 In late 2016, the United States Senate attempted to make sense of a slew of 
seemingly related and absolutely disconcerting events, which appeared to be linked to a 
                                                 
24 Nicole A. Softness, “Social Media and Intelligence: The Precedent and Future for 
Regulations,” American Intelligence Journal 34, no. 1 (January 2017): 32–37. 
25 Carme Colomina, “La Desinformación de Nueva Generación: Cinco Escenarios Políticos y 
Geoestratégicos Ante El Fake,” Anuario Internacional CIDOB, January 2019, 61. 
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coordinated digital intelligence operation which targeted the presidential election. In the 
search for answers on behalf of the American people, the Senate not only called upon 
America’s top three intelligence services for help, they also called upon America’s social 
media providers, whose CEOs were called to testify in congressional hearings.26 It is 
doubtful that Zuckerberg was aware of all of the ramifications that would result from the 
social network he created in his college dorm room in the early 2000s, but there is no 
doubt that in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, Zuckerberg and the rest of 
America confronted several harsh realities about social media. Most notably, Americans 
confronted the dual reality that while social media has the power to bring all of the 
world’s citizens together, the ‘real world’ includes all of the world’s terrorists, traitors 
and spies.  
 Prior to the election of 2016, there was very little research which addressed social 
media’s dual reality or even the possibility of adversarial intelligence services using 
social media as a weapon. Given the increasing number of covert operations that are 
conducted on social media and the relatively unproductive public discussion, it is clear 
that policymakers, citizens and academicians are still lacking clarity in certain areas, 
particularly in the technical aspects of these operations.27 Apart from the technical 
aspects, the history of foreign intelligence services and their previous campaigns against 
American interests is something that is often glossed over or addressed in a sentence or 
two. This issue was highlighted in the July 2018 congressional response to the 2017 
                                                 
26 Sheera Frenkel and Linda Qiu, “Fact Check: What Mark Zuckerberg Said About Facebook, Privacy, and 
Russia,” New York Times, April 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/technology/ zuckerberg-
elections-russia-data-privacy.html.  
27 “Exposing Russia's Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements.” 
U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Senate. Accessed 
November 30, 2019. https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/. 
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Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA).28 Although Congress seemed to value and 
appreciate the US Intelligence Community’s joint efforts to produce valuable unclassified 
materials, Congress noted that the historical narratives, terminology and language which 
informed the intelligence operations of 2016 was noticeably absent from the 2017 ICA.29 
Given the remaining interest in the historical context of intelligence operations, it is 
important that future research into intelligence operations in social media illuminates the 
longevity and continuity of intelligence through historical comparisons.  
As the following chapters will show, there are numerous lessons from historical 
examples which can shed light on what is going on within social media’s platforms. This 
paper will compare past and recent case studies which highlight how social media is used 
to update classical intelligence techniques that are favored by specific intelligence 
agencies. At the conclusion of the case studies, this paper will make recommendations for 
American intelligence researchers. These recommendations will combine this paper’s 
research stemming from the history of intelligence with an updated analysis of the 
technological nuances of digital intelligence operations in the age of social media. 
Although not all of the public’s questions will be answered in the following pages, this 
paper will demonstrate how intelligence operations were structured in the past, how 
intelligence operations have changed due to social media, and how, in many ways, 
intelligence operations have remained the same.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Initial Findings on Intelligence Community Assessment: 
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, 115th Cong., 2d sess., 2018. 
29 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Initial Findings on Intelligence Community Assessment: 
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Russian Intelligence in Social Media 
 
            In 2015, the American Ambassador to Germany stated that the Russian 
disinformation machine was a $400 million dollar media campaign in over 100 
countries.30 One year later, the harsh reality of this statement confronted American 
citizens when it appeared that Russia was attempting to influence the 2016 US 
Presidential Election.31 It began with reports that a server linked to the Democratic 
National Convention (DNC) had been hacked. Days after the hack, a trove of documents 
from the DNC server was published online.32 Shortly thereafter, false online personas and 
groups began to emerge on various social media sites, seemingly out of nowhere. What 
appeared to be the common link amongst all of this activity was America’s Cold War 
opponent, Russia. What was not discussed in the immediate aftermath of all of this 
activity, was whether this kind of malign influence had occurred before. 
An examination of Russia’s intelligence history reveals that 2016 was not the first 
time that Russia has directed its intelligence resources against an American presidential 
election. This essay will argue that Russia sought the same methodological doctrine and 
used the same active measures techniques against presidential elections in the Cold War 
and in 2016. However, the advent of cyber tools created more avenues of execution and 
enhanced the most recent Russian influence activities in 2016. In both eras, Russia sought 
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to denigrate one American presidential candidate over another and to exploit internal 
social and political fissures in the United States. Beyond its tactical goals, Russia utilized 
several common techniques in the Cold War and in 2016. Although Russia uses a wide 
variety of covert influencing techniques, there are several which have been identified and 
assessed to be the most integral to the Russian intelligence apparatus. These techniques 
are part of what Russia calls ‘active measures.’ Several active measures techniques 
include the use of front groups, agents of influence, kompromat, and forgeries. In spite of 
continuing systemic change, analysis will show how the four techniques described above 
have defied regime change, persisted through bloody revolutions and been reinvigorated 
by digital innovation.  
Analyzing these historic intelligence techniques is critical if American 
intelligence professionals do not want to repeat mistakes of the past. For this reason, this 
chapter will perform a critical comparison of Russia’s historic and modern covert 
influence machinery. Apart from explaining common tactical goals, this paper will 
examine the continuity of Russian intelligence techniques. After examining Russia’s 
historical covert influence techniques and defining key terms, this chapter will highlight 
the modern applicability of classical covert influence techniques by situating them within 
case studies. Case studies are one of the best ways to identify commonalities, highlight 
continuities and trace complex processes. This chapter will examine an American 
presidential election during the Cold War and the most recent American presidential 
election of 2016. In both of these elections, Russian covert influence played a key role in 
defining the Russian covert measures canon. Ensuing case study analysis will highlight 
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important concepts and provide recommendations for future researchers and intelligence 
practitioners. 
Literature Review         
 Historical and interdisciplinary sources can greatly assist in the analysis of any 
political phenomenon. Active measures is a topic that has been addressed by historians, 
government researchers, cyber experts and perhaps most importantly, by Russian 
intelligence practitioners themselves. In order to properly situate the case studies, we will 
first examine the origins, definitions and central tenets of the Russian covert influencing 
method of active measures. 
History of Active Measures  
 The Russian term aktivinyye meropriyatiya, or active measures, has no direct 
equivalent in the English language.33 Clinical terms like “psychological warfare” and 
colloquial terms like “dirty tricks” have attempted to capture some of its meaning, but no 
single English word adequately situates ‘active measures’ within the Western intelligence 
lexicon.34 While many definitions exist, researchers Shultz and Godson in their book 
Dezinformatsiya: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation provide one of the most concise 
definitions, describing active measures as, “An array of overt and covert techniques for 
influencing events and behavior in and the actions of foreign countries.”35 Providing a 
more detailed definition is Soviet defector Vasili Mitrokhin, who defines active measures 
in his book The KGB Lexicon as, “Agent-operational measures aimed at exerting useful 
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influence on aspects of the political life of a target country which are of interest, its 
foreign policy, the solution of international problems, misleading the adversary, 
undermining and weakening his position, the disruption of his hostile plans, and the 
achievement of other aims.”36 
In terms of longevity, active measures have been an integral component of 
Russian statecraft for centuries. One hundred years before the Cold War began, the 
Czarist secret police (Okhrana) used a wide range of active measures to quell internal 
dissident groups and penetrate émigré dissident organizations in other countries.37 
Decades later, the Bolsheviks relied heavily upon a combination of propaganda and 
political influence techniques to advance their political agenda.38 Shultz and Godson 
write that it was this unique combination of covert influence techniques that spurned a 
“logical outgrowth” of Soviet active measures techniques during the Cold War.39 Regime 
after regime, dictator after dictator, the practice of active measures eventually became 
inextricable from Russia’s intelligence culture.  
The significant impact of active measures upon US-Soviet relations led Ronald 
Reagan to create the Active Measures Working Group (AMWG).40 The group’s task was 
to research active measures and suggest ways that America could counter its negative 
effects.41 In a report from 1987, researchers from the AMWG delineated some of the 
most common techniques of active measures. Their list included the use of front groups, 
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covert broadcasting, forgeries, agents of influence, manipulation, disinformation, 
forgeries, and overt propaganda.42 Apart from these ‘soft’ measures, the AMWG noted 
that active measures could also extend into more violent activities, including covert 
actions toward incitement, targeted assassinations, and terrorism.43 In one of their most 
seminal reports from 1987, the AMWG wrote that, “Active measures are distinct both 
from espionage and counterintelligence, and from traditional diplomatic and 
informational activities.”44 While espionage traditionally entails an intelligence officer 
covertly collecting information pertaining to foreign countries, active measures entails an 
officer or agent disseminating information (both overtly and covertly) in order to 
influence foreign countries, corporations and individuals.  
In the Cold War, active measures were the responsibility of Service A within the 
First Chief Directorate of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB).45 Service 
A also coordinated operations with the International Department (ID) of the Soviet 
Communist Party Central Committee.46 In a report from 1987, American intelligence 
analysts estimated that there were up to 15,000 KGB officers dedicated to 
“disinformation and psychological warfare efforts” (two practices that fall under active 
measures).47 As for the day-to-day schedules of KGB employees, Vasili Mitrokhin 
reported that Line PR officers (KGB officers stationed in foreign residencies) were 
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required to devote twenty-five percent of their time to active measures.48 In terms of 
financing these activities, the CIA estimated that the KGB spent $4 billion dollars a year 
in the 1980s on active measures (roughly $8.5 billion in today’s dollars).49  
It is important to note that while journalists and academicians within the 
Anglosphere still use the term ‘active measures’ its use has been deprecated in its native 
country and replaced by the term meropriyatiya sodeistviya (“support measures”).50 
According to researchers from the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) 
the public use of the newer term can be traced to a 1992 legal document.51 However, in 
spite of the change in nomenclature, the ICDS researchers concluded that, “Support 
measures are the direct successors of active measures, and merely a new and politically 
correct term formulated after the fall of the Soviet Union.”52 For the purposes of analysis, 
the traditional term of ‘active measures’ will be used in order to avoid confusion and also 
as acknowledgment of the lack of current research on the later term. 
Unique Characteristics of Russian Active Measures 
Although the United States carries out psychological operations, these are usually 
included in the American definition of ‘covert measures’ which do not include the 
prototypical Russian overt practices of propaganda and state-sponsored media outlets.53 
Similarly, the French General Directorate for External Security (GDES) has an ‘Action 
Division’ which carries out some of what Americans would consider ‘covert action’ but 
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is more similar to the special military operations of  Navy SEALs than the intelligence 
operations of James Bond.54 
Apart from differences in terminology, there are various characteristics which 
distinguish Russia’s active measures doctrine from the prototypical covert action doctrine 
of its western counterparts. Shultz and Godson wrote that one distinguishing 
characteristic is that “the means utilized in Soviet active measures are virtually 
unlimited” whereas Western intelligence services “are constrained by major cultural, 
political, and moral considerations.”55  
Another distinguishing characteristic is the question of when active measures or 
covert actions are applied, or more specifically, when each culture feels they should be 
applied. National security law expert M.E. Bowman writes that while Americans view 
covert action as an adjunct to war-time activities, any attempts to “surreptitiously 
influence (or change) another country during peacetime is difficult for us to 
countenance.”56 This doesn’t mean that covert action isn’t exercised during peacetime, 
but simply that its covert nature runs counter to American tenets of openness and 
transparency. Soviet tradition, however, provides a deep-rooted justification for the 
application of active measures in almost any context. As Leonard Schapiro explains, 
“The use of an overwhelming military presence and the maximum espionage and 
subversion presence are part of what has always been described in Soviet terminology as 
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‘ideological struggle’ which is repeatedly asserted as the necessary concomitant of 
‘peaceful coexistence’.”57  
Other distinguishing characteristics of the Russian active measures doctrine 
include its infallible secrecy and its tight concentration of decision-making power within 
the Russian intelligence apparatus. Although largely obfuscated from public view, 
American covert action has stringent statutory reporting requirements as stipulated by the 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 197458 and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991.59 
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment specifically requires the CIA to report all covert actions 
to no less than eight congressional committees (four in each house) which equates to 
roughly sixty congress members plus their staff.60 This decentralized authority structure, 
coupled with American media practices, lends itself to a relatively transparent system 
compared to its Russian equivalent. In modern Russia, former Soviet spy Alexander 
Litvinenko has reported that when the KGB was dissolved and the Russian intelligence 
apparatus was no longer under the microscope of the Communist Party, the various 
security agencies began “operating in Russia absolutely independently and totally 
unchecked.”61  
Another distinguishing characteristic of the Russian active measures doctrine is 
the objective of using active measures to deceive, create confusion and internally 
demoralize targeted nations, largely through propaganda.62 This contrasts with the stated 
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ideals of America’s covert propaganda efforts, which Loch K. Johnson writes as being 
painted more as “giving a helping hand” in order to promote equality and freedom.63 One 
example of this covert helping hand was the American effort to support the Christian 
Democratic party in Italy after the Second World War.64 The resultant outcomes of each 
side’s covert operations can be politically and emotionally interpreted as positive or 
negative, but the intentions of each nation are notable for their contrasts. 
Active Measures Techniques 
Although the Russian active measures spectrum is wide, some techniques have 
received more public attention more often than others.65 Four techniques are notable not 
only for their wide usage but also for their specific usage against American presidential 
elections. These include the techniques of agents of influence, front groups, kompromat, 
and forgery. Because these terms are likely unfamiliar to anyone outside the Intelligence 
Community, we will examine each one individually before analyzing their applications 
within specific case studies. 
Agents of Influence 
First, when defining agents of influence, it is important to distinguish agents of 
influence from traditional espionage agents, just as the AMWG distinguished active 
measures from more ‘traditional’ espionage activities. According to a 1992 report from 
the AMWG, “Agents of influence are foreigners who have been recruited by the KGB in 
                                                 
63 Loch K. Johnson. “The Enduring Myths of Covert Action,” Virginia Policy Review 7, no. 2 (Winter 
2014): 61. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Steve Abrams, “Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia,” Connections: The 
Quarterly Journal Vol. 15, Issue 1 (Winter 2015): 15. 
 
 
 
 25 
order to be used to influence the opinions of foreign publics and governments.”66 While 
traditional espionage agents are tasked purely with collecting information regarding 
events that are happening around the world, agents of influence are tasked with a more 
active role in changing world events. However, in both cases, the agent’s affiliation with 
a foreign intelligence agency remains secret. During the Cold War, agent of influence 
operations were some of the most difficult active measures operations to identify, since 
many agents of influence were perceived by their fellow countrymen as loyal patriots 
expressing opinions that were entirely their own.67 Agents of influence were also often 
tasked to operate within their own social circles, but “for greater effect, they often [were] 
integrated with penetration of enemy groups.”68 
Front Groups 
Another tool within the Russian active measures toolbox is the use of front 
groups. Front groups or front organizations are also used to exert influence over a nation, 
a group of persons or an individual, and they are often political in nature.69 However, 
front groups can also purport to be philanthropic or social organizations. Regardless of 
their function, these groups are never publicly affiliated with the Russian government.70 
During the Cold War, some of the most prominent Soviet front organizations were the 
World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of 
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Students, the Christian Peace Conference and the International Association of 
Democratic Lawyers.71  
Kompromat 
In addition to the ‘softer’ measures of using agents and front groups there is the 
more aggressive technique of kompromat (or compromising information). When a Cold 
War operation required more offensive measures against a person or group of persons, 
the KGB often turned to the collection of kompromat to provide the mechanism towards 
a swift public downfall.72 Sources of kompromat which KGB agents were encouraged to 
find included hidden pasts, private habits, or any character traits that could be considered 
socially deviant.73 When no legitimate compromising material could be found, it was 
simply concocted and then published through whichever news outlet would accept it as 
true. Kompromat was and is such a deeply entrenched and common practice in Russian 
political warfare that today there is a website dedicated to cataloguing the salacious 
stories collected by political opponents called ‘kompromat.ru.’74 
Forgery 
In order to present fabricated kompromat or any other lies that would benefit 
Russia’s foreign interests, the Russian intelligence apparatus often turns to forgeries.75 
Forgeries can serve a myriad of purposes, but are usually directed towards one of two 
purposes: to fabricate denigrating ‘evidence’ against a singular target of active measures 
or to falsify official government documents that would suggest wrongdoing on the part of 
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an entire nation.76 The former type of forgery was often used to augment kompromat. 
The latter type was described by Ladislav Bittman as “slightly ‘improved’ copies of 
genuine government documents that were anonymously distributed among American, 
Western European, or Third World journalists” which were met with varying degrees of 
acceptance.77  
The American Target of Active Measures 
Although Russian active measures were directed against many countries during 
the Cold War, numerous Soviet defectors, including Vasili Mitrokhin and Sergey 
Kondrashev labeled the United States as the ‘main enemy’78 or the ‘main target’79 of the 
KGB’s active measures campaigns, even at the peak of détente.80 At a conference for 
senior KGB officers in January 1984, the goals of active measures were discussed, which 
mostly included frustrating American imperialism, discrediting America and exposing its 
weaknesses.81 Exploiting internal fissures that tore at the social fabric of the United 
States was also viewed as one of the most effective ways to weaken the ‘main enemy’ 
from within.82 Some of the most notable instances where active measures were used 
against the United States included KGB-created conspiracy theories surrounding 
President Kennedy’s assassination83 and the false origin story of the AIDS virus.84 Over 
the course of the twentieth century, the KGB utilized active measures against a variety of 
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targets including Martin Luther King,85 J. Edgar Hoover,86 and numerous American 
political officials who supported anti-Soviet measures in the halls of Congress and 
abroad.  
Active Measures and US Presidential Elections 
 In addition to undermining America’s foreign policy and domestic society, the 
KGB viewed American presidential elections as fair game in the arena of active 
measures. However, depending upon the perceived level of American animosity, the 
KGB could be strategically reserved. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote that 
while the Communist Politburo was always cognizant of the American presidential 
election for its effect on US-Soviet relations, the Politburo never intervened or expressed 
a preference publicly, since this might have more of a detrimental than positive after 
effect.87 The KGB on the other hand, did attempt to influence American elections 
through various active measures campaigns, most of which had a low rate of success.  
In 1960, Soviet influence on American elections took the form of gifts, caviar and 
a proposal for financial backing of two-time failed presidential candidate Adlai 
Stevenson.88 Stevenson, known for his unapologetic stance against nuclear weapons 
testing, was viewed as highly amenable to Soviet interests.89  When Stevenson was 
approached in January of 1960, he thanked Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov for 
the Soviet’s appreciation of his views, but to Stevenson’s inner circle and written in his 
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memoirs, he called the approach "highly improper, indiscreet, and dangerous to all 
concerned."90  
In 1968, Ambassador Dobrynin was tasked with approaching Democratic 
candidate Hubert Humphrey with an offer to subsidize his campaign in order to keep the 
anti-Soviet, anti-communist Nixon out of the White House.91 Humphrey declined and to 
the chagrin of Soviet leadership, Nixon was elected.92 However, Nixon’s policy of 
détente proved to be far better than what Soviet leaders had anticipated. Their 
appeasement was cut short however, when Nixon was impeached for actions that 
Dobrynin considered to be “a fairly natural thing to do. Who cared if it was a breach of 
the Constitution?”93  
 In 1976, Dobrynin wrote in his diary that a different American politician came 
under the eye of the Politburo. Conservative Democrat Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson had a 
political track record of opposing the Soviet Union, particularly on its Jewish emigration 
policies and he seemed poised to gain the Democratic presidential nomination.94 Mark 
Kramer with PONARS Eurasia writes that after Jackson won the Massachusetts and New 
York primaries, the KGB officially launched an active measures campaign against him to 
prevent his entrée into the White House.95 The campaign primarily revolved around using 
fabricated kompromat to paint Jackson as a closeted homosexual (a trend that continues 
into the twenty-first century with world leaders like France’s Emmanuel Macron being 
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targeted).96 KGB agents went as far as to send forged FBI letters to various American 
newspapers and journalists with relevant ‘evidence’ of his sexual orientation.97 The KGB 
was so determined to keep Jackson from entering the White House that even after he 
dropped out of the presidential race, they continued their disinformation campaign 
against him.98  
 Until his bid for presidential reelection in 1984, Ronald Reagan managed to avoid 
the most aggressive tactics on the KGB’s active measures spectrum. However, when he 
got precariously close to securing the Republican nomination in 1976, Mitrokhin writes 
that the KGB began searching for kompromat on the California governor, who had never 
touted anything close to détente in any of his political speeches.99 Reagan failed to win 
the 1976 Republican nomination and instead, the seemingly peaceable Jimmy Carter was 
sworn in as the next American president, but he was accompanied and guided by a 
hardline national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski.100  
In 1980, the KGB was “less involved” in attempting to influence the presidential 
election than four years earlier, since they were (in the words of Ambassador Dobrynin), 
“Fed up with Carter and uneasy about Reagan.”101 Without a great deal of voter support 
and no Soviet smear campaigns, Reagan managed to win the Republican nomination and 
the presidency. However, during Reagan’s first term when he followed his campaign’s 
anti-Soviet rhetoric with forceful executive action, he found himself back in the KGB’s 
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crosshairs. On February 25, 1983, the Centre (KGB headquarters) announced it would be 
launching an aggressive, multi-channel active measures campaign to prevent Reagan’s 
reelection which would mostly consist of searching for sources of kompromat and finding 
any and all means to share it.102 Ultimately, Reagan won 49 out of 50 states, securing him 
an overwhelming 1984 election victory and demonstrating the limited reach of the KGB’s 
influence machinery and the dwindling power of the Soviet Union. In terms of active 
measures campaigns, it would be the last attempt to influence American elections for 
years. 
Modern Active Measures 
In the 1990s under President Yeltsin, the KGB was dismantled like a house of 
cards with its cadre reshuffled into disparate agencies.103 For years after the end of the 
Cold War, Yeltsin’s government made the strategic decision to exploit regional conflict 
in order to exact influence, rather than devote Russia’s precarious government funds 
towards massive external propaganda campaigns.104 With Russia’s intelligence services 
in missional limbo, on December 31, 1999 Yeltsin resigned amidst accusations of 
mismanagement and corruption.105 Shortly after his resignation, the practice of active 
measures was almost immediately reinvigorated thanks to a sixteen-year KGB veteran 
who initially found himself as the acting prime minister and later the elected president of 
Russia.106  
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The resurgence of Russian active measures cannot be discussed without 
discussing President Vladimir Putin. Since his successful bid for election in 2000, Putin 
has created what Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White call a ‘militocracy’ by 
saturating the Russian government with former state security employees, referred to as 
siloviki.107 Putin’s intricate realignment of power has mirrored the Cold War culture of 
his predecessors to such a degree, that some have called his regime a “neo-KGB state.”108  
Whether he is using active measures to attack democratic systems, weaken 
peaceful transatlantic alliances or exploit other countries’ internal conflicts in order to 
provide Russia with more power and political advantages on the world stage, it appears 
that Putin has integrated KGB doctrine into Russia’s modern intelligence practices.109 
One of the most effective ways that modern Russian intelligence agencies have 
accomplished this is by leveraging new cyber tools to attack enemy states during their 
election seasons.110 
 Numerous democracies have shown symptoms of what they believe stems from 
Russian interference in their electoral processes.111 For our purposes of study, the most 
pivotal case of post-Cold War Russian electoral interference occurred in 2016 during the 
American presidential election. Although previous attempts to influence post-Cold War 
elections have been quiet operations of small-scale propaganda campaigns, the 2016 
American presidential election showed an unprecedented demonstration of force which 
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has shocked several other nations into bolstering the security surrounding their own 
electoral processes.            
The inherently covert nature of active measures has always made it difficult for 
researchers (particularly those outside the intelligence community) to verify and make 
definitive judgments regarding their impact on current events. Additionally, the lack of 
post-Cold War defector accounts and Russian intelligence service handbooks limits the 
number of primary sources used for verification. In spite of these limitations, various 
intelligence assessments,112 cyber security reports113 and congressional testimony114 have 
all corroborated the assessment that the 2016 U.S. presidential election was the latest and 
most devastating manifestation of Russian active measures directed against the United 
States. There is also little doubt that with the advent of cyber tools, the scope of active 
measures tactics has grown wider than it was during the Cold War.115  
As modern instances of Russian intelligence influence are investigated by 
governments, more information is now available for comparative research. Several think 
tanks,116 non-governmental organizations117 and international organizations118 are also 
dedicating fiscal and human capital towards the identification of Russian active measures 
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tactics in the twenty-first century. However, there is still a pressing need for trend 
identification, quantitative analysis and modern theory development in the study of 
Russian active measures in a digital society.   
Methodology 
 To test the theory that the same techniques of Russian active measures were used 
during the Cold War and are still being used today, we will examine two active measures 
campaigns as case studies. The case study method provides a framework for analyzing 
complex phenomena across a variety of fields, but it is particularly well-suited for 
process tracing. The cases to be studied are the active measures campaigns carried out 
against the targets of the 1984 and 2016 US presidential elections.  
In terms of case selection criteria, the following attributes were reasons for case 
selection: data richness, resemblance of case background conditions, prototypicality of 
case background conditions, and intrinsic importance. First, the cases were selected due 
to their comparatively high coverage in academic research and government reporting. 
Although the research literature addresses other Cold War instances of Russian active 
measures used against the American political system, the lack of source diversity and the 
dearth of corroborative reporting eliminated additional cases from this examination. 
Second, the cases being studied had similar targets of active measures. That is, both 
active measures campaigns were directed towards the American presidential election 
process. Third, the cases were chosen for their prototypicality. They were prototypical 
both in terms of their antecedent conditions which consisted of the American electoral 
process and in the resulting active measures campaigns that exemplify central tenets of 
the Russian active measures doctrine. Lastly, the cases were selected for their intrinsic 
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importance and resemblance to current situations of policy concern. Foreign interference 
has been a prolonged topic of discussion within the American legislature and a high 
priority for the U.S. Intelligence Community ever since the 2016 election.119 Although 
case studies of other nations might also benefit American political researchers, it was 
imperative in this paper that the selected cases address the current climate of concern 
regarding the 2016 American presidential election. 
 We will present the cases chronologically and use a narrative framework that is 
intended to illuminate the underlying goals and resulting active measures techniques 
employed in both cases. First, we will present the background and tactical goals for 
commencing the active measures campaign. We will then present the techniques that 
were observed in both instances. Lastly, we will address the election outcomes in both 
instances. This is not an examination of effectiveness or political impact. Rather, the 
comparative method of case study will allow us to assess whether common tactical goals 
and techniques were used in both eras. This analytical framework will not only lay the 
groundwork for our process analysis, but also for future analysis of Russian active 
measures campaigns in other democracies. 
Case Study #1 The 1984 U.S. Presidential Election 
Background             
Our first case study concerns Ronald Reagan’s 1984 US presidential race and the 
active measures enacted by the KGB that attempted to prevent his reelection. Although 
Soviet active measures were heightened and especially targeted against Reagan in 1984, 
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the KGB had been monitoring the career of the Californian politician for years prior to 
his reelection. 
Reagan initially caught the attention of the KGB during the Republican primaries 
of 1975 .120 Reagan’s public rhetoric was so unabashedly anti-Soviet that the Centre 
believed that if he was elected president, he might be anti-Soviet enough to launch one of 
the nuclear weapons that the Americans were undoubtedly stockpiling.121 To prepare for 
such a situation, the KGB initiated a series of soft active measures, mostly involving 
research and collection of kompromat, in 1976.122 These efforts were stalled when 
Reagan lost the Republican nomination to incumbent Gerald Ford.123  
Four years later, when it was presented with anti-Communist Reagan or Jimmy 
Carter’s aggressively anti-Soviet National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the 
KGB was at an impasse.124 In an uncharacteristic bout of reticence, Soviet leadership 
waited on the sidelines to see who would win the election. The KGB would later regret 
this decision, as Ronald Reagan would take on an even more aggressive stance against 
the Soviet Union than his democrat predecessor.125 
            After their strategic restraint from using active measures during the 1980 
presidential election, the Centre’s number one objective for the 1984 election was clear: 
prevent Ronald Reagan from being elected for a second term.126 Vasili Mitrokhin 
assessed that it was likely the strong desire for discrediting Reagan’s administration 
which led the chairman of the KGB to announce on April 12, 1982 that all foreign 
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intelligence officers now had to participate in active measures (even those not assigned to 
Service A).127 Roughly a year later, on February 25, 1983, the Centre announced it would 
be launching an aggressive, multi-channel active measures campaign specifically against 
Ronald Reagan.128  
Kompromat 
The previously collected kompromat on Reagan that had lain dormant for years 
was approved to be disseminated through mass media channels. While any source of 
negative information can serve as kompromat, one of the issues which KGB focused on 
was the possibility that Reagan’s father’s alcoholism affected Reagan’s current health.129 
Although Regan later commented in his memoirs about the strain of his father’s 
alcoholism on his family, this was not viewed as a smoking indictment against the person 
of Ronald Reagan.130 The Centre also assessed that Reagan possessed “weak intellectual 
capabilities,” but this was not a central tenet of most of their anti-Regan materials.131 
Instead, they relied more strongly on amplifying his political aggression as they crafted 
articles that were published in Denmark, France and India.132 All of their efforts were not 
futile, as some of the KGB’s negative press gained some traction abroad, but ultimately it 
failed to take hold in the United States.133  
Agents of Influence 
To bolster the scraps of kompromat the KGB possessed on Reagan, the Centre 
called upon its three American residencies (embassies where KGB agents operated) in 
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Washington D.C., New York, and San Francisco. The American residencies were ordered 
to obtain contacts in both political party’s headquarters and on the staffs of all possible 
presidential candidates.134 For additional assurance, residencies outside the United States 
were required to send any agents they could who would be willing to assist.135 The goal 
of acquiring these contacts and bringing in additional agents was to find any pertinent 
information on Reagan and procure personal channels for its dissemination.136 
Unfortunately, primary sources are lacking with regards to the efficacy of any agent of 
influence operations in 1980. However, the lack of reporting suggests that this 
requirement was either not fulfilled or bore little fruit since no agents of influence came 
forward and no reports regarding suspected Soviet agents were published by either 
campaign after the election.  
Front Groups 
In addition to kompromat and agents of influence, the KGB also used front groups 
in their attempt to hinder Regan’s chances of reelection. The benefit of using front groups 
was that similar to Soviet agents of influence, their ties to the Centre were still 
obfuscated, but their geographic coverage and political influence could also provide clear 
advantages to any Soviet smear campaign.137 As part of the active measures campaign 
against Reagan, the KGB ordered its front groups to spread the political slogan “Reagan 
means war!”138 Though the slogan was not very popular, any modicum of anti-American 
sentiment expressed abroad was attributed by the KGB as a sign of success.139 In spite of 
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many Soviet front groups’ recognition by reputable bodies such as the United Nations, 
UNESCO and the United Council of Churches, Soviet efforts in this campaign failed to 
influence the key demographic of American voters.140 According to Reagan’s biographer 
Edmund Morris, Reagan was successful in swaying the Soviet populace when he 
unabashedly labeled the Soviet Union as ‘an evil empire’ in his ‘Crisis of Confidence’ 
speech delivered on March 9, 1983.141 Within twenty-four hours, Westerners in Moscow 
reported that a reaction of “self-disgust and self-acknowledgment” spread throughout 
Russian society against their own government.142 
Forgery 
 When compromising information, personal influence and political slogans were 
ineffective, the dissemination of forged pieces of information was a common active 
measures tactic. In Instructions from the Centre, Christopher Andrew and Oleg 
Gordievsky note that Service A’s forgeries against the Reagan administration were 
generally of two kinds: ‘silent forgeries’ shown in confidence to Third World leaders or 
not-so-silent forgeries that were intended to promote media campaigns.143 During his first 
term, Reagan was the subject of repeated forgeries, one of the most notorious being a 
fabricated letter to the King of Spain, urging the European leader to quickly “remove the 
forces obstructing Spain’s entry into NATO.”144 Copies of this letter were mailed to 
Spanish journalists as well as all delegates (except the Americans) attending the Madrid 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).145 The letter made reference 
                                                 
140 Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 52. 
141 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 474. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Andrew and Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre, 97. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
 40 
to a ‘highly secret’ memorandum which was also fabricated by the KGB and also 
circulated along with the letter.146 Due to its crude presentation, the letter had negligible 
impact and several Spanish journalists publicly accused them of being of Soviet origin.147  
Summary 
The 1984 Election active measures campaign failed to detract from Reagan’s 
popular appeal with American voters. Like several other Cold war active measures 
campaigns its perceived effectiveness was overinflated by KGB operatives. Christopher 
Andrew further notes that, “The limitations of KGB active measures were illustrated by 
the failure of a single Residency in a NATO country to popularise the principal slogan 
“Reagan means War!”148 Reagan won 49 out of 50 states in the electoral college, which 
secured him a second term and additional resources towards his anti-Soviet policies.149 
By any standard, the 1984 election active measures campaign was not viewed as a 
success. 
Case Study #2 The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
Background             
In 2016, more than thirty years after the 1984 US Presidential Election, America 
was going to the polls to elect a new commander in chief. During this election cycle, the 
three primary candidates were Republican Donald Trump, Democrat Hillary Clinton and 
third-party candidate Bernie Sanders. Like the active measures campaign during the 1984 
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election, the active measures directed towards the 2016 election were planned well in 
advance of Election Day.  
Kompromat 
Just like in 1984, soft active measures in the form of kompromat collection began 
in September 2015, when the FBI contacted the Democratic National Committee (DNC) 
to inform them that one of their computers had been hacked by a Russian cyber actor.150 
In November 2015, the FBI contacted the DNC again, to report that one of their 
computers was now actively transmitting information back to Russia.151 On June 14, 
2016 the Washington Post reported that Russian hackers gained access to DNC servers 
which included documents pertaining to opposition research on Donald Trump.152 A day 
later, an unknown blogger named Guccifer took credit for the hack, claiming to be a 
Romanian hacktivist who was unaffiliated with Russian intelligence.153 A week later, 
Wikileaks published nearly 20,000 emails online that had been exfiltrated from the DNC 
server.154  
Although cyber hacking can be used for a variety of criminal and intelligence 
gathering purposes, the deliberate targeting and pursuant publication of the personal 
emails and documents from the DNC server was labeled by many as a clear instance of 
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kompromat.155 In December 2016, it was discovered that several Republican party 
servers were also hacked and exfiltrated. However, these documents were never made 
public; a fact that supported a later U.S. Intelligence Community assessment that the 
Russian influence campaign sought to denigrate Hillary Clinton rather than Donald 
Trump.156 
Agents of Influence 
As a means to spread their collected kompromat, Russia employed several digital 
versions of classical agents of influence. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community 
Report Russian Interference in the 2016 Election, Russia integrated this technique into a 
longstanding messaging strategy, which historically involved a blend of agents of 
influence, cutouts and front organizations.157 In 2016, this specifically entailed the use of 
“third-party intermediaries and paid social media users or “trolls.”158 
Unlike agents of influence used during the Cold War, most of these agents did not 
actually exist. The majority consisted of fake online personas created by the Internet 
Research Agency, a company owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is one of Vladimir 
Putin's close friends.159 Several news outlets have gotten interviews from former Internet 
Research Agency employees who have worked in Russia’s notorious ‘troll factories’ 
where employees were instructed on how to pose as real Americans and then post and 
propagate social media content that is favorable to Russia’s foreign and domestic 
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agenda.160 While some personas claimed to be Americans like the Southern, right-wing 
Twitter personality Jenna Abrams, others claimed to be foreigners who were seeking the 
truth amidst the American election, like Guccifer 2.0.161 In addition to the notable fake 
personalities, there were thousands of automated agents of influence, otherwise known as 
‘bots’ created by the Internet Research Agency that were mostly deployed to tweet and 
retweet on the social media outlet Twitter. Research by the cyber security firm FireEye 
found that Russian bots successfully made one of Russia’s fake hashtags 
(“#HillaryDown”) listed as ‘trending’ on Twitter, meaning that it garnered enough public 
attention to be listed on the Twitter homepage.162 
Front Groups 
In addition to creating fake individuals, Russia utilized digital front groups as 
well. Most of the front groups were created on the popular social media platform of 
Facebook where they garnered tens of thousands of ‘likes’ until the group pages were 
removed by Facebook administrators.163 In terms of their efficacy to influence the 
American electorate, two front groups on opposite ends of a civil rights issue both 
managed to physically rally their followers to protest against each other outside an 
Islamic center in Houston, Texas.164 One front group called ‘Heart of Texas’ had 250,000 
followers and a tagline of “Homeland of guns, barbeque and your heart.”165 The other 
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group that Russia managed to mobilize was called ‘United Muslims of America’ and had 
328,000 followers and a tagline of “I’m a Muslim, and I’m proud.”166  
Forgery 
Cementing all of these methods together was a novel remediation of the method 
of forgery. Of the two forgery methods used against the Reagan Administration, which 
included silent forgeries sent to world leaders and forgeries intended for mass media, the 
2016 forgeries more closely resemble the latter approach. In 2016, forgery was not used 
to paste together fake letters to be viewed by a single reader. Rather, it was used to create 
an air of legitimacy within social media, whose inherent data infrastructure renders 
information provenance and a writer’s true identity next to impossible to discern.167 In an 
indictment filed on February 16, 2018, Special Counsel Robert Mueller and his team 
stated that from at least April 2016 through November 2016 Russian actors purchased 
advertisements on Facebook using false personas.168 They then began to produce, 
purchase, and post these fake advertisements on other social media sites which expressly 
advocated for Trump or expressly opposed Clinton.169 Instead of the slogan “Reagan 
Means War!” there was a constant stream of hashtags that were attached to various social 
media posts. Some hashtags used included “#Hillary4Prison” and “#NeverHillary”.170 
Over the course of the congressionally mandated review of fake Russian accounts after 
the election, Facebook’s analysts found “approximately $100,000 in ad spending from 
June of 2015 to May of 2017 — associated with roughly 3,000 ads — that was connected 
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to about 470 inauthentic accounts.”171 They also reported that the falsified accounts 
“appeared to focus on amplifying divisive social and political messages across the 
ideological spectrum — touching on topics from LGBT matters to race issues to 
immigration to gun rights.”172  
Summary 
 As news of alleged Russian interference continued to circulate, the outgoing 
President Barack Obama directed the Intelligence Community to perform a full review of 
what happened during the 2016 election process.173 To the general public, it may have 
initially seemed as though Russia had only used covert influence against the 2016 
presidential election.174 However, after examining the 1984 and 2016 elections side by 
side, several commonalities are apparent between Russia’s Cold War and modern 
approaches. 
Case Study Analysis 
            From the two case studies above, several classical techniques emerge in common. 
Kompromat is one technique that Russia used to denigrate American presidential 
candidates. As seen in the case studies, the use of kompromat is similar in both cases, but 
the ability to acquire kompromat and the ability to deny attribution has been enhanced 
greatly by cyber hacking tools.175  
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Another technique is the use of front groups. Although the KGB was known to 
have front groups embedded all across America and most certainly in Washington 
throughout the Cold War, they were not always capable of delivering the compromising 
material requested by Moscow.176 Cold War-era front groups were usually confined to 
physical groups of people, which required physical presence and an inevitable paper trail. 
The numerous fake Facebook groups created in 2016 however, came in and out of 
existence within the span of several months and without a single publicly available 
document to verify their origins.  
A third technique, similar to that of front groups is the use of agents of influence. 
Although the KGB requested that its agents of influence gain contacts on the presidential 
campaign staffs in 1984, there has not been any evidence to suggest that this was 
successfully carried out. However, in 2016 when a young American girl named Jenna 
Abrams started publishing political charged tweets on Twitter shortly before the election, 
she garnered significant attention from politicians, journalists and the American public.177 
Abrams engaged in Twitter arguments with former U.S. ambassador to Russia and 
Russian propaganda expert Michael McFaul, she was retweeted by Mike Flynn Jr. and 
was also mentioned in stories featured in the Washington Post and The New York 
Times.178  
Lastly, the technique of forgery was used in both cases to present false 
information that was advantageous to Russian interests. In the 1984 election, forgeries 
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took the physical form of official government letters. In the 2016 election, forgeries 
evolved to suit the digital medium and provided Russian front groups with the 
appearance of legitimacy within the social media sphere. 
Conclusion 
The Russian influence campaign of 2016 warrants not only a historical review of 
active measures used against American elections as we have done here, but also a 
forward-looking assessment. Although they appear to be the heir apparent of active 
measures, how are ‘support measures’ organized and assigned? Are cyber hackers the 
new spies? In what areas are old traditions abandoned and where are they stridently 
indoctrinated into the next generation?  
 This chapter is intended to shine light upon the continuum of active measures 
techniques that have been seen in the 1984 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The 
United States has had historical successes in exposing Russian forgeries,179 identifying 
agents of influence180 and countering the actions of Russia’s international front groups.181 
However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, much of the US Intelligence Community’s 
awareness and vigilance against Russian covert influence was lost.  
The 2016 Presidential Election reminded the US Intelligence Community and 
Congress of the reality of foreign interference in American electoral processes and it 
initiated a series of inquiries, investigations and public discourse. However, in spite of all 
of the new information that has come to light, in July 2018, the Select Senate Committee 
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on Intelligence found the 2017 US Joint Intelligence Assessment’s coverage of “the 
historical context of Russian interference in U.S. domestic politics perfunctory.”182 In 
other words, policymakers appear to understand the recent findings from the 2016 active 
measures campaign, but feel there is a blatant lack of historical contextualization to assist 
in the government and the public’s understanding of the modern Russian intelligence 
machinery. 
While there are many insights that American citizens and policymakers can glean 
from the events of 2016 and the ensuing congressional research, one aspect stands out. 
This aspect is what former CIA Director Mike Pompeo called ‘strategic understanding.’ 
Developing a strategic understanding of Russian active measures techniques can help 
politicians, American voters and the Intelligence Community prepare for attempts to 
influence future elections. During the Cold War, numerous Soviet defectors pointed out 
the need for Western intelligence services (the United States, in particular) to reexamine 
and reevaluate Russian intelligence tactics and to weigh this against Russia’s potential for 
political subversion.183 
As evidenced by the Senate findings, there is a general need for public awareness 
of the history of active measures which synthesizes this history with the future, 
particularly with regards to cyberspace. Over thirty years before the 2016 US Presidential 
Election, Soviet defector Ladislav Bittman shared some prescient predictions in his book 
The KGB and Soviet Disinformation : An Insider's View: 
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Computers are another source of valuable operational data for the KGB. 
Their use for storing, processing and transferring sensitive data about 
individuals in private sectors, such as banking and medicine and state or 
federal revenue sectors, opens new fields for Communist intelligence 
services. KGB operatives in the United States are very interested in 
computer encoding research both military and civilian. Access to this 
magic key would enable the KGB to penetrate the privacy of almost every 
American without getting involved in risky and time-consuming 
operations. More important, the KGB would be able to pollute the 
computer system with disinformation about individuals or companies, 
seriously damage their lives and paralyze their operations. (209-210)184 
 
The openness of the Internet benefits Americans just as much as it benefits 
America’s enemies. Any American who engages in the digitized, interconnected world 
should be aware that while the collective spaces of the Internet are free and open, they are 
not always populated by genuine truth-tellers and allies. As hackers, terrorists and spies 
co-author history’s current chapter of digital covert action, it is imperative that the 
world’s citizens are made aware of Russia’s historical attempts to undermine American 
institutions so that future targets of active measures will not be doomed to repeat 
mistakes of the past. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Iranian Intelligence in Social Media 
 
 The previous chapter of this paper examined Russia’s historical and current covert 
influence campaigns and the effects of social media on their preferred covert influence 
tactics. With so much coverage devoted to Russia, many Americans are ignorant of the 
broad spectrum of operations conducted by one of America’s most persistent adversaries 
in the digital realm: the nation of Iran. Over the past two decades, operating under the 
cloak of proxy actors and virtual private networks, Iran has built a reputation as a 
formidable cyber power. Within the US Intelligence Community Iran is known for 
launching brutal cyberattacks against American government entities, corporations, and 
individuals.  
In recent years, Iran has started to favor the use of a specific classical espionage 
technique in its cyber operations. The digital revival of this technique has allowed Iran’s 
malicious cyber actors to not only target computer systems and critical infrastructure, but 
also humans. The technique which Iran is incorporating into its cyber toolbox is the 
honey trap. Honey traps typically involve the use of an alluring intelligence officer who 
is used to entice unwitting adversaries into sharing secret information through the 
leveraging of a personal (and sometimes romantic) relationship. Today, the classic honey 
trap collection technique has become digitized and is quickly becoming a hallmark of 
Iran’s intelligence collection strategy. 
The Internet and social media have affected governments around the world in 
different ways. One way that these new technologies have affected governments is in the 
ability to digitize information. Formerly physical formats of classified documents are 
now generated, edited, and disseminated within networked digital environments, which 
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sometimes bleed over into various sectors of society. Apart from the digitization of 
classified documents, it is also becoming apparent that former physical manifestations of 
an intelligence officer’s identity are now manifest in the form of bits and bytes, scattered 
across digital space, and waiting to be discovered by cyber-savvy adversaries. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than the Internet spaces of social networking sites. 
Although many social networking sites have outed Russia for its malicious 
Internet activity, Iran is proving to be just as dangerous in social media. As this chapter’s 
analysis will show, Iran’s cyber actors are equally skilled at persuading social media 
users to believe false information, infiltrating secure computer systems, and causing 
damage that ranges from slightly detrimental to gravely damaging to US national 
security.185 Because Iran’s malicious use of social media is growing and is proving to be 
damaging to individuals, companies, and governments, it is a worthy topic of study for 
modern intelligence researchers. 
Due to a current lack of knowledge regarding the threat of Iranian foreign 
intelligence operations in social media, this chapter will seek to provide an enhanced 
understanding of this issue in the form of case studies. The case study method is an 
effective approach for isolating process steps and highlighting pertinent details. This 
chapter will present two case studies where Iranian actors successfully engaged unwitting 
social media users and used digital honey traps to gain access to sensitive information. 
The first case illustrates Iran’s self-generated use of a fake, but attractive-looking digital 
persona, which was used to gain persistent access to corporate computer networks. The 
second case illustrates a hybridized version of the honey trap, which incorporates both 
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digital personas and a real human behind it, in the form of American defector to Iran, 
Monica Witt.  
Ensuing analysis will compare the cases, highlight online security concerns for 
social media users and suggest lines of future research. Due to the national security threat 
posed by this malicious activity, it is imperative that social media users with access to 
sensitive or classified data are made aware of this threat and are equipped with the 
knowledge to defeat it. By critically examining Iran’s preference for certain intelligence 
collection techniques in social media, US intelligence agencies, academic institutions and 
private individuals can better protect themselves and preserve national security in an 
increasingly digitized world.  
Literature Review 
In terms of research on traditional intelligence tradecraft and digital honey traps in 
social media, there is very little open source literature that addresses both of these topics 
in tandem. However, a great deal of research has been devoted to analyzing the topics of 
traditional honey traps, digital identity deception, and the targeting of individuals online 
(also known in cyber parlance as ‘spear phishing’). A review of the current research 
within these areas will help to situate the following case studies and ensuing analysis.  
Traditional Honey Traps 
 The Oxford Dictionary defines a honey trap as, “A stratagem in which an 
attractive person entices another person into revealing information or doing something 
unwise.”186 Within this broader definition there are varying approaches and 
methodologies employed by foreign intelligence agencies and resistance movements 
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throughout history. Although the majority of human intelligence is gathered through the 
vector of rapport-based, real life relationships, the honey trap adds a specific layer of 
enticement that is highly tailored to the target. From the renown and eventual execution 
of seductress Mata Hari, to the lesser known cadre of East German male seducers known 
as “Romeo spies,” the honey trap has historically been applied by various nations with 
varying degrees of success.187  
 Several authors have tangentially addressed the topic of honey traps as part of a 
historical examination of women in intelligence. This is likely due to the culturally 
ingrained association of females with the honey trap technique. Long before the Cold 
War and going back to ancient times, women have often been cast as the seducers within 
honey trap operations. The Biblical story of Sampson and Delilah lays out the archetypal 
honey trap scenario of an unwitting male who is smitten by a female tasked with 
obtaining secret information. This classical female honey trap archetype has been used 
over multiple centuries and in various cultures. The formalized honey trap operations that 
the world knows today were likely not developed until the hiring of female intelligence 
officers. It has been argued by some historians, that this formalized technique of 
intelligence gathering did not take hold until the First World War, when today’s modern 
intelligence bureaucracies were in their infancy.188 In both World War I and World War 
II, women were hired to play a critical role in intelligence gathering for both sides. Their 
success was largely due to their unsuspecting demeanors and their rapid grasp of spy 
tradecraft. After the two World Wars gave way to the Cold War, more complex and long-
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term honey trap operations were directed against male, female, heterosexual, and 
homosexual targets.189  
One of the most notorious agencies to employ honey traps was Russia’s KGB, 
which used male agents (called ‘uncles’) to manage either female prostitutes or female 
KGB employees (both referred to as ‘swallows’). The ‘uncles’ were tasked with 
instructing ‘swallows’ on the best methods for seducing male targets and obtaining high 
quality foreign intelligence. These activities could range from rifling through the contents 
of an American intelligence officer’s suitcase or obtaining secret information regarding 
the United States’ future plans for NATO.190 Although the CIA has publicly denied using 
honey traps, its British counterpart, MI-6 regularly used honey traps during the Cold War. 
At the Eve Club on Regent Street in London, a cadre of women were hired to lure 
unsuspecting Soviet diplomats and businessmen into divulging state secrets.191 Today, 
classical honey traps remain a viable intelligence gathering option, though many 
intelligence agencies continue to deny using this method. However, some of the most 
recent honey trap accusations have been leveled against the Chinese intelligence 
services.192  
Iranian Intelligence: From Political to Digital Revolution 
 Although non-state sponsored groups can form loose intelligence agencies, it can 
be difficult to build an efficient intelligence bureaucracy without the backing of a 
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national government. When governments are in turmoil, intelligence agencies often have 
to make very hard choices with the goal of self-preservation. After years of political 
upheaval and a consolidation of various government agencies, in August 1983, Iran’s 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was created in order to set new intelligence 
priorities and streamline Iran’s fractured intelligence community. After its initial 
formation, MOIS was charged with collecting intelligence on Iran’s foreign and domestic 
enemies and carrying out various covert missions in support of the Iranian regime. 
Today, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (responsible for military 
intelligence) and the Quds force (responsible for intelligence collection abroad) also 
serve as supplemental intelligence collection agencies which work in tandem with 
MOIS.193 The IRGC is also known for supporting foreign client organizations via the 
Quds Force. These foreign client organizations also serve as proxies for carrying out 
foreign operations and expanding Iranian influence in the Middle East region.194  
 In terms of its HUMINT operations, Iran’s focus is largely turned towards the 
United States and its neighboring countries.195 Iran also listed the nation of Iraq amongst 
its intelligence enemies after the US-led invasion in 2003, as well as several other Shi’a-
majority countries and countries with unpopular Sunni rulers.196 Similar to many other 
intelligence agencies, Iran uses diplomatic cover for a lot of its intelligence officers. Iran 
has also been known to be somewhat haphazard in its tradecraft, with many of its 
diplomatic officers being exposed over the years. Lately, Iran has also directed its 
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HUMINT operations towards Latin America, where it exploits networks of Shi’a 
individuals to report on Iranian interests in the Southern Hemisphere.197 
 Apart from its HUMINT operations, Iran has been slowly building its cyber 
capabilities not only within its military cadre, but also within its intelligence cadre. The 
impetus for this can be traced back to 2010, when the Stuxnet virus shook Iranian 
centrifuges. This caused Iran to devote government funding to the creation of a Supreme 
Council of Cyberspace (Shora-ye Ali-ye Fazo-ye Majazl), which would eventually 
coordinate all of Iran’s cyber programs, bolster its national defenses, and supplement its 
intelligence collection efforts.198 That same year, Iran also established a Cyber Defense 
Command (Gharargah-e Defa-e Saiberi) that was tasked with defending Iranian critical 
infrastructure.199 Ever since 2010, Iran has continually enhanced its cyber resources.  
 The most critical aspect of Iran’s cyber program for the purposes of this paper, is 
its encroachment into the traditional sphere of HUMINT operations. As more Iranian 
intelligence operations are analyzed and brought under public scrutiny, it is clear that Iran 
is demonstrating an increasing preference for combining modern cyber tools with specific 
techniques of traditional HUMINT tradecraft. Listed among these techniques is the honey 
trap, which will be explored more in-depth in the case studies to follow. Although Iran’s 
malicious cyber activity has been seen in malicious email campaigns and computer 
network exploitation, it is becoming more and more prevalent within the human-centric 
platform of social media. 
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Identity Deception and Social Media 
 Deception, as defined by Buller and Bulgoon’s Interpersonal Deception Theory, is 
“a message knowingly transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion by the 
receiver.”200 In a digital context, several theories have emerged to explain how deception, 
and particularly identity deception, is perpetuated in social media.  
Several studies on identity deception online have highlighted the role of the truth 
bias and the halo effect as contributors to the success of online identity deception.201 The 
truth bias is the assumption that everyone is telling the truth.202 This bias diminishes 
social media users’ ability to detect when someone is lying about their identity. The halo 
effect stems from classical psychology and involves the formation of positive judgments 
about individuals based upon positive first impressions.203 In digital media, the halo 
effect has been studied in reference to social norm violations. In one study, an 
individual’s early violation of a powerful social norm tainted a group’s positive view of 
the individual, in spite of the individual’s pro-social and norm-abiding actions after their 
initial violation.204  
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In addition to the truth bias and the halo effect, social disinhibition is another 
phenomenon related to digital environments that has been discussed in cyber psychology 
literature.205 Dubbed ‘the online disinhibition effect,’ by researcher John Suler, this effect 
is believed to be aided by several components of digital interpersonal engagement. Suler 
writes about six factors which interact and contribute to the online disinhibition effect. 
Three of the primary factors include dissociative anonymity, invisibility, and what Suler 
calls ‘communicative asynchronicity.’206 Early research on computer mediated 
communication (CMC) found that people are more revealing about themselves in digital 
environments than in face-to-face communication.207  
Scholars have generally distinguished between two types of deception; one type 
concerns providers of information, and the other concerns the nature of the information 
provided.208  While several modern researchers have studied the latter type of deception 
by examining social media users’ propensity to communicate deceptive information, 
fewer researchers have probed how social media affects the way in which identity 
deception is carried out. 
Several researchers have contrasted different media with rates of deception 
(comparing telephonic, email, and instant messaging with face-to-face interactions).209 
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Both truth and deception are more difficult to detect in CMC than in face-to-face 
interactions, due to the lack of physical and visual source cues. This commonly leaves 
CMC users left with interpreting textual and content cues. Additionally, researchers have 
found that the types of lies that people tell in face-to-face interactions differ between the 
types of lies perpetuated in CMC. In face-to-face interactions, people tell more lies of 
omission, whereas in CMC, they tell more lies of commission (aka bald faced lies).210 
Some of the specific techniques used to perpetuate deception in social media include 
“bluffs, mimicry (such as mimicking a website), fakery (such as establishing a fake 
website), white lies, evasions, exaggeration, webpage redirections (such as misleading 
someone to a false profile page), and concealment (such as withholding information from 
one’s profile).”211 
Detecting Identity Deception and Social Media 
 Research into identity deception detection in social media has largely focused on 
automated or technical means of deception detection.212 Through the use of artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning, several researchers are probing the possibilities of 
textual analysis in the detection of false identities. Through the use of supervised learning 
models, some researchers have sought to unravel fake identities through the analysis of 
social media text messages.213 In some studies, the application of AI to fake identity 
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detection has proven to have a success rate of 99 percent.214 However, the vast majority 
of this research has been in reference to spam or bot-generated accounts and not accounts 
that are manually operated by humans purporting to be other humans.215   
 Specific methods of humans detecting lies in social media have been proposed. 
Some of the methods include detecting inconsistencies in the gender and expected 
background color of the person’s account.216 Other methods include searching for 
statistical inconsistencies in geo-location and update times.217   
As human involvement in social media increases, universal feelings of trust, hope, 
and social acceptance tend to cloud critical judgment and result in much lower deception 
detection rates. Outside of digital interfaces, humans are notoriously bad at detecting 
interpersonal deception, with detection rates slightly better than random chance or 50 
percent accuracy.218 Within social media, the risks for deception are compounded, since 
digital personas can be quickly generated across numerous social media platforms. 
Although there has not been a lot of research using adult subjects, digital 
researchers have used child subjects with parental consent in controlled identity 
deception studies. In one study, children ages 12-18 were asked to identify the age and 
gender of a stranger in a chatroom.219 The main findings in this study were that only 16 
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percent of child subjects were correct in guessing age, and only 10 percent were correct 
in guessing gender. Although the detection rates increased amongst older subjects, the 
highest detection rates were 22 percent (for guessing age) and 16 percent (for guessing 
gender) amongst year 11 and year 12 students. When asked how they evaluated the 
veracity of users’ online identities, the child subjects said that content (e.g. what the user 
talked about) played a key role in their decision-making process. 
Spear Phishing 
 One particularly pointed form of online identity deception is the act of spear 
phishing. Although spear phishing takes many shapes and forms, Stephen Northcutt with 
SANS Technology Institute defines it as, “A pinpoint attack against some subset of 
people (users of a website or product, employees of a company, members of an 
organization) to attempt to undermine that company or organization. It isolates a specific 
group of people, as opposed to spamming the world, and attempts to get them to do 
something to gain access to proprietary data or company systems. It will often look real 
and appear to come from a legitimate member of the organization. For instance, a spear 
phish may appear to come from an executive of the company asking for login IDs and 
passwords.”220 
 Like spam emails, the malicious act of phishing (i.e. the targeting of many 
individuals in order to gain elevated access to information) has existed since the early 
days of the Internet in the 1990s.221 Spear phishing, however, is a more recent 
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phenomenon. In contrast to general phishing, spear phishing requires more time and 
effort, but with potentially higher payloads. As time has progressed, both petty criminals 
and nation states have seen the efficacy of spear phishing in obtaining money, blackmail 
materials, and classified information. Although email remains the preferred method of 
spear phishing worldwide, the use of social media as a spear phishing platform is gaining 
ground.  
 In August 2018, a United States intelligence official publicly declared that China 
was waging a “super aggressive” campaign to target LinkedIn users with access to 
confidential material.222 A year earlier, an unsealed affidavit was published, detailing the 
online recruitment of a former top-secret clearance holder, Kevin Mallory. The affidavit 
reveals that Mallory was contacted through LinkedIn by someone who he believed to be a 
Chinese headhunter. After messaging back and forth, Mallory eventually travelled to 
China and brought several US government documents with him which were classified at 
the top-secret level. The FBI indicted Mallory on one count of 8 U.S.C. § 1001 (Making 
Materially False Statements) and one count of 18 U.S.C. § 794 (Gathering or Delivering 
Defense Information to Aid a Foreign Government).223  
 Like Russia’s election interference campaign, China’s LinkedIn spear phishing 
efforts are merely a small fragment of today’s foreign intelligence activity within social 
media. While it may be impossible to capture all of the nuances within this expanding 
digital environment of intelligence collection, focusing on one nation and one tactic is 
helpful for studying trends and making future predictions. In this chapter, background, 
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analysis and recommendations will focus on the nation of Iran and the concept of digital 
honey traps. 
Methodology 
As a way to analyze how Iranian state-sponsored cyber groups use digital honey 
traps in social media, this chapter will examine two recent cases. The method of case 
study presents an ideal format to examine complex processes and isolate important 
aspects of theoretical concepts. Given the complexities of honey traps, social media 
technology, and modern cyber operations, the method of case study is the best approach 
for introducing this topic into broader discussions.  
The first case to be studied involves a fake LinkedIn persona named ‘Mia Ash,’ 
an Iranian cyber group, and several unwitting LinkedIn members who were infected with 
spyware after engaging with an alluring, but ultimately fake persona. The second case 
study involves an American defector, a string of unwitting American clearance holders, 
and a private Facebook network that allowed a false persona into its inner circle. 
In terms of case selection criteria, the following attributes were reasons for case 
selection: data richness, prototypicality of case background conditions, and intrinsic 
importance. First, these cases were selected due to their comparatively high coverage in 
international cyber security discourse and journalistic reporting. Although other cases of 
cyber espionage and cyberattacks have been covered in public outlets, many of these 
other cases lack in-depth analysis of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used, as well 
as corroborative reporting, which is why they were not selected. Second, these cases were 
chosen for their pointed use of the digital honey trap within a social media context. 
Lastly, these cases were selected for their intrinsic importance and relevance to current 
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areas of policy concern. Foreign intelligence interference via social media has been a 
prolonged topic of discussion within the American legislature and a high priority for the 
US Intelligence Community ever since the 2016 presidential election.224 Because the 
digital honey trap is an evolving foreign intelligence threat in the sphere of digital covert 
activity, examining several recent cases will provide a substantive benefit to American 
policymakers and citizens. 
This chapter will examine these cases using a narrative framework that is intended 
to illuminate the underlying mechanics of digital honey traps when they are used as a 
foreign intelligence tool. First, a review of the background conditions of the cases will 
introduce readers to the digital environment of modern intelligence targets. Next, the 
cases will show how vectors of contact have changed in the digital age. In addition to 
contact vectors, the cases will illuminate social media techniques that bolstered the 
mechanics of the campaign’s deception. Lastly, the cases will present the damage of 
digital honey trap campaigns. After examining the case studies, this chapter will explore 
ways that the digital honey trap threat is evolving and provide recommendations for 
future research.  
This case study analysis is not a comprehensive overview of Iran’s intelligence 
programs. Rather, it is an examination of a single intelligence collection vector that is 
being deployed by Iran, and likely by other foreign intelligence adversaries. Through the 
analytical lens of case study analysis, this chapter will not only provide after-action 
analysis for the case studies in question, it will also lay the groundwork for future 
inquiries into digital honey trap operations by other intelligence agencies. 
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Case Study #1: Mia Ash, OilRig, and PupyRAT  
 In 2016, Dell’s SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit detected some malicious cyber 
activity that resembled the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by a well-known 
Iranian cyber threat group, known as OilRig.225 This activity was logged and noted, but 
no significant connections to specific actors were made during this time.  
Then, in 2017, a LinkedIn profile belonging to a female with the username Mia 
Ash appeared. The profile began sending invitations to connect with a select group of 
men online. Ash claimed to be a twenty-something photographer based out of London 
who displayed a particular affinity for Middle Eastern, tech-savvy men working in the oil 
and gas refinery industries. To keep up digital appearances, Ash had a legitimate-looking 
resume, several filtered profile photos as well as regular posts and updates to her social 
media accounts. To an unassuming LinkedIn user, Ash’s profile containing over 500 
connections appeared to be unassuming, if not well-connected, judging by the polished 
look of her profile. In addition to her robust LinkedIn profile, Ash also had social media 
profiles on Facebook, Blogger, WhatsApp, and the artistic online social networking site, 
DeviantArt.  
 On the surface, Ash seemed like a friendly and adventurous young woman with a 
penchant for high-ranking Middle Eastern executives in the oil refinery and technology 
industries. Her modus operandi was simple. Ash would initiate contact by sending an 
innocent message to a CEO or vice president via LinkedIn’s messaging application, then 
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Ash would request that her new friend move their correspondence to a different social 
media platform, typically Facebook Messenger or an email provider. 
While Ash was luring high-value targets in social media, around February 2017, 
Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit detected some additional malicious cyber activity 
that resembled the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the well-known Iranian 
cyber threat group, OilRig. A slew of corporate victimized computers appeared to have 
been compromised via malicious macros embedded in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, sent 
via email attachment. Before any attribution or forensic assessments could be made, 
SecureWorks still needed to determine an initial attack vector and find the source of all of 
this damage.  
 In February 2017, a team of SecureWorks cyber investigators was deployed to a 
Middle Eastern company to diagnose an attempted spyware infection. During their 
deployment, it was discovered that one of the company’s employees had been 
communicating with the Mia Ash LinkedIn persona for over a month.226 According to 
victim statements, an employee of the victimized company began an online relationship 
with Ash on LinkedIn. Ash had approached the employee with photography questions, 
then moved the relationship to Facebook and other nodes of electronic contact.227 
 At one point during their communications, Ash asked the employee to download a 
‘photography survey’, in the form of a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Moreover, Ash 
insisted that the employee open the survey on his work computer, otherwise, she told 
him, the survey would not work properly. Unfortunately, upon opening the file, the 
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employee unleashed a vicious remote access trojan (RAT) known as ‘PupyRAT,’ which 
immediately gained administrator privileges across the corporate computer network and 
started exfiltrating sensitive digital records to a remote server.228 
 After months of analyzing the PupyRAT activity and performing cyber forensic 
analysis, SecureWorks attributed Mia Ash, the remote spyware and the malicious activity 
to the Iranian advanced persistent threat group OilRig.  
Case Study #2: The Secret Facebook Network of Bella Wood  
 On February 8, 2019, a seven-count indictment against former AFOSI Special 
Agent Monica Witt was filed in the District of Columbia.229 In addition to unveiling a 
slew of espionage charges levied against Witt, the unsealed indictment also unveiled a 
previously unknown digital honey trap campaign directed against US Air Force 
employees with access to specialized programs. The targets included “current or former 
Special Agents, counterintelligence analysts and other USIC employees who were 
coworkers or colleagues” of Witt. 
 The story of Witt’s eventual defection to Iran began years before her alleged 
violations of US law. In February 2012, Witt traveled to Iran for the purpose of attending 
a “Hollywoodism” conference, sponsored by the IRGC and aimed at condemning 
America’s lax moral standards. Shortly thereafter, Witt was seen in online videos, where 
she openly shared her status as a US veteran, her anti-American views and a public 
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statement about a recent conversion to Islam. Based on the evidence of the case, FBI 
officials later stated that Witt’s defection appeared to be ideological in nature.230 
Between 2012 and 2013, Witt was in contact with the IRGC and someone 
identified as “Individual A” in the indictment.231 Through snippets of FBI-collected 
communications, Witt appeared to be eager to assist Iran and was ultimately given 
several opportunities to do so, largely through the vector of social media.  
 Around July and August 2013, Witt began conducting Facebook searches for 
former AFOSI counterintelligence colleagues. On August 28, 2013, Witt officially 
defected to Iran and from then on, Witt conducted Facebook queries for US government 
employees using fictitious Facebook accounts registered to multiple fake personas. 
Between January 2014 and May 2015, Witt “created ‘target packages’ for use by Iran 
against USG Agents, including USIC counterintelligence officers.” Furthermore, around 
the same time, Witt disclosed the true name of a US government agent, as well as the fact 
that he or she conducted counterintelligence activities. 
 While Witt was performing social engineering research and building social 
media-derived target packages, in January 5, 2015, a group of Iranian cyber actors 
created an email account, bella.wood87@yahoo.com as well as an associated Facebook 
account with the username “Bella Wood.” Shortly after the account was created, the 
Iranian cyber actors used it to send a Facebook friend request to a US government 
employee (referred to in the indictment as “USG Agent 2”) who was currently deployed 
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to Kabul, Afghanistan with US Central Command (CENTCOM) Joint Intelligence 
Unit.232 During this deployment, USG Agent 2 used a US Department of Defense 
computer to access Facebook. Around January 9, 2015, several Iranian cyber actors sent 
an email to USG Agent 2 with a spoofed link that purportedly directed USG Agent 2 to a 
“pretty card.” The spoofed link actually led to a server which was controlled by the 
Iranian cyber actors. The email itself also used covert tracking software to confirm that 
USG Agent 2 was reading the email from a US Department of Defense computer network 
located in Kabul, Afghanistan. On January 9, 2015, bella.wood87@yahoo.com emailed 
USG Agent 2 again, using the following text: “I’ll send you a file including my photos 
but u should deactivate your anti virus to open it because i designed my photos with a 
photo album software, I hope you enjoy the photos i designed for the new year, they 
should be opened in your computer honey.” The links to the purported photos would have 
also directed USG Agent 2 to a server controlled by Iranian cyber actors.  
Around the same time frame, Iranian cyber actors created a fake Facebook 
account using the true name of an individual noted in the indictment as “USG Agent 3.” 
This was done using real photos and information that was gleaned from a legitimate 
Facebook account maintained by USG Agent 3. Using their newly created fake Facebook 
account, the Iranian cyber actors sent a Facebook friend request to an individual known 
as USG Agent 1, who accepted it. Within roughly twenty-four hours, the fake Facebook 
account sent USG Agent 1 a message with what appeared to be a .jpg image file, but was 
in fact, a .zip file containing malware that would have given the Iranian cyber actors 
“covert, persistent access on USG Agent 1’s computer and any associated network.”  
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Around March 10, 2015, the Iranian cyber actors were able to persuade a 
Facebook user known as “USG Agent 5” to not only accept a friend request, but also to 
vouch for the fake Facebook account and add the fake account to a private Facebook 
group comprised mostly of USG Agents. In accomplishing this, the Iranian cyber actors 
gained multiple lines of access to personal and intimate information regarding US 
government employees. In May 2015, the same fake Facebook account sent separate 
messages to four other US government employees containing links that seemed to lead to 
international news articles, but in reality, led to pages controlled by the Iranian cyber 
actors.  
Although the public will likely never know the full extent of the damage caused 
by Witt, former intelligence officials have described it as “severe”, given Witt’s former 
top-secret security clearance, her alleged violations of national defense statutes, and the 
suspicion that she revealed the names of double agents run by the United States.233  
Case Study Analysis 
 In classical espionage, honey traps are men and women groomed to attract the 
attention of unsuspecting intelligence targets, but in the case of the KGB ‘swallows,’ 
these honey traps were sometimes blackmailed themselves into working as agents of the 
state. This coerced handling dynamic often created problems for KGB handlers of 
swallows. In the digital realm, where honey traps are nothing but computer code, Iranian 
handlers do not simply wield more control over their digital ‘swallows’ and have far 
fewer risks of defection, they also possess the collective wealth of the world’s knowledge 
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at their fingertips. These may be some of the reasons why the fake persona of Mia Ash 
was labeled by SecureWorks as one of the more sophisticated honey trap personas in 
recent history.  
However, in spite of her successes, Ash wasn’t perfect. 
 Like many fake social media profiles, the digital pieces which comprised Ash’s 
profile were not crafted by Iranian intelligence officers. Rather, they were pilfered from 
across the Internet. Although the Ash persona was likely rooted in extensive research 
before it was deployed, the following analysis will show that it did not have the same 
human element as the honey trap set by Monica Witt.  
Rather than being her own entity, the Mia Ash persona was a digital pastiche of 
publicly available jpeg and plaintext files which were stolen from the digital lives of 
others. Several of Ash’s profile pictures and photograph uploads to her Blogger account 
were stolen from a Romanian woman with the DeviantArt moniker 
‘Bittersweetvenom.’234 Additionally, Ash’s LinkedIn resume bullets appear to have been 
copied almost word for word from an American female’s LinkedIn profile.235 From an 
intellectual property standpoint, Ash’s entire persona was one huge violation of copyright 
law, which no one caught until her victims recognized the serious damage she had caused 
to national security.   
As part of their published analysis, the SecureWorks researchers noted several 
specific social network anomalies, which assisted them in their attribution of the Mia Ash 
persona to the Iranian threat group. First, all of Ash’s non-photography connections were 
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located in Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, and 
they all worked for technology, oil/gas, healthcare, aerospace and consulting 
organizations. This conflagration of Iranian intelligence targets that formed the bulk of 
Ash’s connections was one of the first indications to SecureWorks that Mia Ash had 
ulterior motives that seemed in sync with the OilRig Iranian cyber threat group.  
Second, apart from the geographic and topical interests which aligned with known 
OilRig targets, SecureWorks also noted that all of Ash’s connections were “mid-level 
employees in technical (mechanical and computer) or project management roles with job 
titles such as technical support engineer, software developer, and system support.”236 To 
a trained cyber analyst, the people in these roles carried elevated access within corporate 
networks, which would have given a cyber threat actor better access to a targeted 
environment.  
Third, all of Ash’s connections appeared to align with broader Iranian government 
“ideological, political and military intelligence objectives” which are likely not held by 
single female photographers looking to make friends on the Internet237 
Regardless of the indicators of Iranian intelligence involvement in the Ash 
persona, the sophisticated fake social network aided by the knowledge and research of 
defector Monica Witt demonstrates a dangerous escalation of Iran’s intelligence 
operations in social media. 
In the case of Monica Witt’s ‘Bella Wood’ persona and her multiple fictitious 
Facebook accounts, this multifaceted honey trap was greatly bolstered by the real-life 
experience of American defector and honey trap hybrid, Monica Witt.  
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Although Witt’s indictment avoids naming specific individuals or delving into 
much detail on the content of the communications between Witt’s fake personas and her 
targets, it does communicate a relative ease with which Witt infiltrated the unwitting 
network of former colleagues and current US government agents. 
Like the Ash persona, Witt used photos from someone else’s real social media 
page, but Witt had the benefit of being able to draw from her personal knowledge of the 
targets. This allowed her to craft non-alerting content and messages, which allowed her to 
secure positive responses to her surreptitious ‘friend’ requests.  
Additionally, as someone with experience using, querying and manipulating the 
social media platform of Facebook, Witt was well-equipped to infiltrate its disparate 
social networks, including a private Facebook group of US government employees. In the 
FBI’s indictment of Witt, the FBI agent details the multiple rounds of research conducted 
by Witt in Facebook’s open search portal. Witt’s research and rapport-building skills 
were so good, that she was able to penetrate a private Facebook group, allowing her 
enhanced access to a cache of information and a pre-vetted group of potential agents. 
 Compared to the Mia Ash persona, the case of Monica Witt demonstrates that 
although HUMINT collection is becoming increasingly digitized, the invaluable inclusion 
of the human factor will likely make digital honey traps even more sophisticated and 
effective, particularly if there are passionate, ideologically driven defectors involved. 
When a foreign intelligence service is crafting a simple mass-marketing covert influence 
campaign, much of the tedium can be eradicated by using AI, carefully crafted algorithms 
and computational propaganda. However, when it comes to targeting high value 
individuals (like Witt’s former AFOSI counterintelligence colleagues), the Monica Witt 
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case demonstrates the power that comes from having a living, breathing human on the 
other side of the screen, who can navigate social media’s nuances and breathe an air of 
authenticity into malicious online personas.  
 Today, Witt is believed to be residing in Iran, where she is effectively shielded 
from extradition to the United States. No matter where she resides, social media 
continuously allows this former US clearance holder to do more damage to US national 
security interests than she ever could have prior to social media. By connecting her with 
handlers and Iranian cyber experts, social media allows distance-directed honey traps like 
Witt to operate with reckless abandon, until their activities are detected by modern cyber 
tools and repaid with appropriate forms of retaliation from the US intelligence 
community. 
Conclusion 
 According to the IBM Security Services 2014 Cyber Security Intelligence Index 
over 95 percent of all incidents investigated by IBM recognized “human error” as a 
contributing factor.238 In the sphere of modern intelligence, where the Internet has vastly 
increased the size of the global attack surface, slight human errors of judgment can 
morph into irreversible national security disasters. As the analysis above demonstrates, 
Iran’s intelligence services are proving to be innovative and relentless in their efforts to 
access sensitive information. Beneath social media’s shining surface, it is important to 
remember that all it takes is one instant of human error for America’s enemies to gain 
access to troves of top-secret information.  
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This chapter analyzed classical intelligence techniques which Iranian intelligence 
has revived within social media. Private cyber security firms have performed valuable 
post-incident analysis of the intricacies of Iranian digital honey traps. However, from the 
human intelligence angle, protracted and ongoing research in this area is lacking. The two 
case studies analyzed in this chapter present a small sliver of the totality of Iranian digital 
honey trap campaigns. Further research is required in order to assess the broader footprint 
of Iranian intelligence collection techniques in social media.  
In terms of mitigation, up until now, social media providers have performed a 
limited number of preventative actions to protect against identity deception. This has 
largely involved the closing of fake ‘bot’ accounts which violate terms of use agreements. 
Given the scope and sensitive nature of concerted foreign intelligence campaigns, more 
effort should be dedicated towards developing standard methodologies for detecting 
foreign intelligence actors in social networking sites.239 Although the initial implications 
of identity deception might seem insignificant, the long-term costs of successful honey 
traps and other malign intelligence operations can be devastating. The spillage of state 
secrets and the pillaging of sensitive technologies are just some of the initial payoffs that 
foreign intelligence agencies gain from the types of operations analyzed in this chapter. 
As new challenges arise and the tactics of foreign cyber adversaries evolve, 
continuing research into this area can unmask malicious activity, connect common 
threads that attribute bad cyber actors, and develop additional counterintelligence 
measures. By heeding the lessons gleaned from these case studies and from future 
research, American intelligence practitioners can be better equipped to face the 
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challenges of socially networked adversaries in the digital age. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Chinese Intelligence in Social Media 
 
Thus far, this paper has examined two of America’s intelligence adversaries and 
has analyzed the ways in which social media enhances classical intelligence techniques 
favored by those adversaries. This chapter will examine how social media has enhanced 
Chinese agent recruitment. 
China is unique among America’s foreign intelligence adversaries for many 
reasons. Chinese intelligence has been known to recruit primarily ethnic Chinese as 
agents.240 It has also been known to adopt a broader view of what many other agencies 
would label “intelligence.” Lastly, in contrast to many Western intelligence officers who 
make it obvious when they have recruited someone and entered into a confidential 
relationship, the Chinese will rarely label these valuable intelligence relationships as 
such. Instead, Chinese intelligence officers will classify the relationship as social or 
professional, even though to highly trained Western eyes, there are clear intelligence-
gathering dimensions.  
One of the most striking aspects of Chinese intelligence is its ‘grains of sand’ or 
‘vacuum’ approach to collection.241 This approach is described in a metaphor that 
circulated through the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division for years and has become 
synonymous with America’s number one Asian intelligence adversary. As explained by 
former FBI analyst Paul Moore, “If a beach was an espionage target, the Russians would 
send in a sub, frogmen would steal ashore in the dark of night and with great secrecy 
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collect several buckets of sand and take them back to Moscow. The US would target the 
beach with satellites and produce reams of data. The Chinese would send in a thousand 
tourists, each assigned to collect a single grain of sand. When they returned, they would 
be asked to shake out their towels. And they would end up knowing more about the sand 
than anyone else.”242  
This incredibly thorough yet cautious approach to intelligence is one of the 
hallmarks of Chinese human intelligence. In terms of its efficacy, this has historically 
been up for debate. For decades, the feasibility of processing, sorting and making general 
sense of such large volumes of information was unrealistic. Today, with the advent of 
machine learning, supercomputers and artificial intelligence, a collection technique that 
was once considered excessive and ineffective by other intelligence agencies, is now a 
productive reality. As China’s and the rest of the world’s records become digitized, the 
intelligence field moves semantically closer to embodying the grains of sand metaphor. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the realm of social media.  
While China has historically preferred to spot, assess, recruit, and meet its 
intelligence agents on Chinese soil, the twenty-first century has provided an additional 
vector for human agent recruitment in the form of social media. Within social media’s 
digital environment, covert relationships thrive, encrypted communications are the norm 
and no virtual customs officials exist to question whether a digital citizen has sent 
classified materials across borders. In particular, professional networking sites like 
LinkedIn are proving to be well-suited venue for Chinese agent recruitment.  
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Since entering the digital sphere of social media, China has become a highly 
aggressive online intelligence adversary. China has accomplished this by first leveraging 
the most innocuous of online social relationships in order to increase its foreign 
intelligence repository. Second, China has simultaneously imposed rigid domestic social 
media regulations based on its conception of ‘Internet sovereignty’ which exist to the 
detriment of Western democratic nations and China’s own citizens.243  
In the following pages, this paper will argue that social media offers a more 
seamless, discreet and effective vector for Chinese agent recruitment. Applying the case 
study method, this chapter will present a case of pre-social media Chinese agent 
recruitment and a case of post-social media Chinese agent recruitment, the latter 
conducted through the professional networking site LinkedIn. Following the presentation 
of the case studies, ensuing analysis will highlight critical aspects of this modern 
phenomenon and propose suggestions for future research. What the case studies and 
ensuing analysis will show is that China’s social media-enabled agent recruitment should 
be of particular concern for the US Intelligence Community because of the ways in which 
it expedites and conceals the early phases of agent recruitment. 
Literature Review 
The HUMINT Recruitment Cycle 
 Human intelligence or HUMINT has often been called “the world’s second oldest 
profession.”244 Although diverse opinions argue over what precisely constitutes 
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“intelligence” there is wide consensus regarding the steps of the process of human agent 
recruitment. This is also known as the ‘agent acquisition cycle’ which various 
intelligence agencies employ.245 The five steps to this cycle include the following: 
targeting or spotting, assessing, recruiting, handling, and termination.246 Targeting is the 
initial identification of individuals who are believed to have access to intelligence. 
Assessing is the research and decision-making process that seeks to narrow the field of 
potential human assets. Recruiting is the critical step in which an intelligence officer 
‘pitches’ the potential human asset, and the formal confidential relationship begins. 
Handling is the ongoing relationship between the recruited agent and his or her handler, 
where intelligence is provided to the handler, often in exchange for money, goods, or 
other benefits. Termination is the dissolution of the confidential relationship for any 
number of reasons, whether it is the endangerment of the human asset, a lack of 
productivity by the asset or a change in an agency’s intelligence requirements.247 As 
intelligence officers move forward in their careers and relocate around the world, they 
may also ‘turnover’ assets to fellow intelligence officers in order to continue the stream 
of intelligence, if termination is unnecessary. 
Traditional Chinese Agent Recruitment  
 As many sinologists and historians will attest, China has a long history tied to the 
world’s second oldest profession, dating back to at least the fifth century B.C.E. In Tsun 
Zhou’s The Art of War, the final chapter of the famed military strategist deals exclusively 
with espionage.248  According to Tsun Zhou, spies come in five different garden varieties 
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and can be used for action, information-gathering, deception operations and many other 
tasks in order to serve the state or secure military successes.249 
Over the centuries, as China’s military and foreign policy objectives have shifted, 
its intelligence apparatus and operational methodologies have also shifted. Prior to 
establishing diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, the opportunities for 
Chinese espionage were few and far between and almost exclusively carried out by 
Chinese nationals who were tasked by their own government and then sent overseas.250 In 
fact, prior to 2009, the only Chinese espionage case to reach prosecution was that of 
Larry Wu-Tai Chin, who was a CIA translator with the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS).251 Recruited in the 1940s, Chin was paid hundreds of thousands of 
dollars over four decades and handled according to Western intelligence service 
tradecraft standards.252 Chin was recruited while working for the U.S. Army Liaison 
Office in Fuzhou and continued to spy past his army retirement date. Over his lifetime, 
Chin provided Chinese intelligence with interrogation transcripts of Chinese prisoners 
during the Korean War, the identities of CIA employees, as well as scores of classified 
CIA and FBIS documents.253 Chin’s Ministry of Public Security handlers typically met 
him in Hong Kong or the mainland, but also provided him with a courier who would 
meet Chin at a mall in Toronto to retrieve any pertinent documents he had for his 
handlers.254 Chin signaled that he was ready to meet with his handlers by sending letters 
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to addresses in Hong Kong or Guangzhou. Some sources reported that the Chinese had an 
exigency plan to exfiltrate Chin out of the United States using an intelligence officer 
disguised as a priest who lived in New York.255 
 With its vast territory and deeply entrenched belief in state sovereignty, China has 
rarely sent its officers abroad to perform recruitments in place. The exception to this 
would be when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sent officers abroad during the years 
leading up to 1949, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded.256 
Following 1949, and after severing its ties with the Soviet Union, Chinese intelligence 
entered an isolationist phase that has continued to this day. While China progressed 
through several decades of limited diplomatic engagement, Chinese intelligence adapted 
its ethnocentric human recruitment methodology accordingly. Operating under varying 
kinds of isolationist restrictions, Chinese intelligence began to adapt its operational 
tactics in order to reduce the amount of contact between case officers and agents.257  
From the mid to late twentieth century, Chinese intelligence also added another 
technique to their HUMINT toolbox: grooming and ‘seeding’ agents by convincing them 
to apply to sensitive positions within the United States government.258 A classic example 
of this was the case of naturalized U.S. citizen Chi Mak. After immigrating to Hong 
Kong, Chi began providing the Chinese with plans of U.S. warships and visitor lists of 
U.S. naval commanders visiting the port city. In the 1970s, Chi immigrated to the United 
States, where he earned his citizenship in 1985.259 In 1996, Chi gained a security 
                                                 
255 Mattis, “Assessing Western Perspectives on Chinese Intelligence,” 685. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid., 688. 
 83 
clearance through his work at Power Paragon, a subsidiary of L-3 Communications. For 
over forty years, Chi provided intelligence to the Chinese and assisted in the handling of 
other U.S.-based assets.260 Before getting arrested in 2005, Chi provided intelligence on 
the Quiet Electronic Drive, which powered the new U.S. Navy Virginia-class submarines 
and similar sensitive technologies.261 
According to China expert Peter Mattis, today’s Chinese intelligence apparatus is 
comprised of several institutions, including the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Second Department of the People’s Liberation 
Army General Staff Department (2PLA), or the Liaison Office of the General Political 
Department.262 China’s MSS still gathers a vast amount of HUMINT by co-opting high 
numbers of ethnic Chinese residing within the PRC or abroad, although non-ethnic 
Chinese have also been co-opted.  
In order to spot and assess individuals who may be open to recruitment, the 
Chinese have traditionally relied on open source material gleaned from American 
businesses, technical societies, and universities.263 Although it is not classified, the value 
of open source intelligence or “OSINT” should never be underestimated, particularly 
when it is analyzed and synthesized by a veritable adversary. Compared to the high-risk, 
extraterritorial recruitment operations of Western intelligence agencies, the Chinese 
prefer to exert a high degree of control over the recruitment environment, as evidenced 
by their preference to recruit human assets within the PRC. This preference, noted by 
Chinese intelligence scholar Nicholas Eftimiades, is summarized below:  
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The MSS prefers to recruit agents in China. Recruiting foreign nationals on one’s 
own soil tends to be a secure and cost-effective method of conducting espionage. 
The primary benefits are the safe environment for the case officer and the lack of 
ramifications should the prospective agent decline the recruitment pitch... A 
secondary benefit of recruiting espionage agents in one’s own country is that 
governments need not incur the cost of maintaining case officers and their 
families overseas. In addition, this method is generally considered safe vis-a-vis 
foreign counterintelligence concerns.264  
 
In order to lure foreign nationals to Chinese soil, common forms of cover include 
invitations for industry experts, government officials and academics to visit China on a 
lecture circuit or a lengthy, multi-day job interview. These clandestine “job interviews” 
may comprise of professional meetings, a slew of social events and often a great deal of 
alcohol. All of this is thrown at Chinese HUMINT targets in the hopes that this 
combination will wear down the target and make them more amenable to revealing 
private or personal matters.265 At a certain point during this carefully constructed 
rigmarole, the invitee is offered the opportunity to continue their relationship with the 
cover entity (often a Chinese university, MSS-affiliated research institution or state-
sponsored company) and provide them with more materials than was originally agreed 
upon. Quite often, this request is for classified materials. If the semi-professional 
relationship treads into covert territory and an actual recruitment takes place, then the 
agent will sign an agreement, conferring them a sum of money and promising their 
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Chinese handlers their continued “cooperation” at a later date. Once co-optees or agents 
have been recruited in China they are then sent back to the United States with taskings to 
collect intelligence on science, technology or classified material of interest to the PRC.266 
Like the controlled recruitment environment, source handling amongst Chinese 
intelligence is often restricted to face-to-face meetings on Chinese soil, typically when 
the human asset claims they are visiting the PRC on business or for pleasure. This type of 
cover can often be maintained for decades without coming to the attention of American 
counterintelligence, as China has often had a special interest in sensitive science and 
technology targets, working in both the public and private sector.267 
While many of the world’s most active intelligence agencies rely upon a steady 
flow of cash in order to motivate their assets, China’s ethnically homogenous cadre of 
human assets is often initially motivated by a sense of cultural and social obligation.268 
This is further enabled by China’s social pressure cooker process of recruitment with its 
heavy emphasis on ‘mutual understanding’ and cultural exchange. For non-ethnic 
Chinese who are recruited, they are often fluent Mandarin speakers with an excellent 
grasp of the language and a deep understanding and fondness for the culture. These 
multifaceted layers of motivation further blur the relationship lines between social, 
professional and clandestine categories. 
Chinese Agent Recruitment 2.0: Covert Recruitment in Social Media 
 LinkedIn was founded as a professional networking site in 2003 and as of 2019 
has more than 660 million users in 200 countries worldwide.269 In an increasingly 
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fractured and politicized Internet, LinkedIn stands out for its multicultural appeal. In 
contrast to the strict exclusion of many western social media sites like Facebook and 
Twitter, LinkedIn has been allowed to operate in many digitally sovereign nations like 
China, Iran and even North Korea.270 While this may seem advantageous from a global 
economic standpoint, several recent uses of LinkedIn by adversarial cyber powers tell a 
cautionary tale. Although the full extent of the involvement of foreign intelligence 
agencies on LinkedIn has not been reported, there have been several journalistic outlets 
which have reported on numerous incidents in recent years. 
 On July 24, 2015, the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence agency, MI-5 sent 
an email that served as a “Security Service Espionage Alert.”271 Among the key findings 
and warnings in the email was the note that “hostile foreign intelligence services are 
increasingly using LinkedIn to find, connect with and begin cultivation and recruitment 
of current and former HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] employees.”272 
In December 2017, the German domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz (BfV) reported that Chinese Intelligence had created a network of 
fake LinkedIn profiles that had contacted over 10,000 German citizens.273 The BfV 
publicly shared some of these profiles with the news outlet Reuters, which upon review, 
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reported that some of these profiles had “senior diplomats and politicians from several 
European countries” amongst their connections.274  
In October 2018, the French newspaper Le Figaro, received a leaked jointly 
written report from the French DGSI and DGSE (France’s domestic and foreign 
intelligence agencies, respectively). The document reported that French state employees 
had been guilty of “culpable naivety” with respect to Chinese intelligence agents seeking 
them out through LinkedIn.275 Purportedly, thousands of French government employees 
had been approached by Chinese avatars, causing French intelligence to alter its security 
posture in June 2017 and to respond to attacks ‘blow for blow’ from that point onward.276 
In August 2018, a United States intelligence official publicly declared that China 
was waging a “super aggressive” campaign to target LinkedIn users with access to 
confidential material.277 United States intelligence officials have said that Russia, Iran, 
North Korea and other nations also use LinkedIn and similar platforms for agent 
recruitment but that “China is the most prolific and poses the biggest threat.”278 
Methodology 
To analyze how Chinese intelligence agent recruitment has evolved in social 
media, this chapter will examine two cases: one, where an American citizen was recruited 
in a pre-social media context and another case where an American was recruited in a 
post-social media context. Specifically, this chapter will highlight differences in the 
spotting, assessing and recruitment phases. The method of case study presents an ideal 
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format to examine complex processes and isolate important aspects of theoretical 
concepts. Given the various stages of agent recruitment, the uniqueness of the Chinese 
approach, and the complications of social media, the case study method is the most 
optimal for examining this topic and bringing it into the broader research discussion.  
The first case to be studied is that of Peter Lee, a naturalized American citizen 
from Taiwan, whose frequent business trips to China’s mainland resulted in a textbook 
Chinese agent recruitment. The second case study is that of Kevin Mallory, a former CIA 
case officer, whose life circumstances led him to paste his resume into LinkedIn and 
respond to a Chinese ‘job recruiter’ who eventually persuaded Mallory that it was in his 
best interests to hand over classified documents to Chinese Intelligence in exchange for 
money. 
In terms of case selection criteria, the following attributes were reasons for case 
selection: data richness, prototypicality of case background conditions, and intrinsic 
importance. First, these cases were selected due to their comparatively high coverage in 
journalistic and official government reporting. Although other cases of Chinese 
espionage and American agent recruitment have received coverage in public outlets, 
many of these other cases do not have primary source documents or the same level of 
detail and corroboration, which is why they were not selected. Second, the following 
cases were chosen for their prototypical representation of China’s approach to agent 
recruitment within and outside of social media. Lastly, these cases were selected for their 
intrinsic importance and relevance to the current Chinese espionage threat. Although 
covert influence via social media has been a prolonged topic of discussion amongst the 
American public, the covert recruitment of human sources in social media is equally if 
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not more concerning. Because intelligence agent recruitment via social media is a new 
threat in the modern counterintelligence sphere, examining these cases will provide a 
substantive benefit to American intelligence practitioners and policymakers. 
This chapter will examine these cases using a narrative framework that is intended 
to illuminate the underlying mechanics of classical and digital agent recruitment. First, 
this chapter will present the narratives of the cases. Next, this chapter will examine how 
the initial vectors of contact have changed and what the implications are for modern 
American intelligence officers. After examining initial vectors of contact, this chapter 
will highlight aspects of social media that enhance the process of agent recruitment. 
Lastly, ensuing analysis will explore ways in which this threat is evolving and then 
provide recommendations for future research.  
The ensuing analysis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of 
China’s entire intelligence program. Rather, it is an examination of a single intelligence 
collection vector that is being deployed by China, and likely by other foreign intelligence 
adversaries. Through the analytical lens of case study analysis, this chapter will not only 
analyze the case studies in question, it will also lay the groundwork for future inquiries 
into digital agent recruitments carried out by other foreign intelligence adversaries. 
Case Study #1: Peter Lee: Thinker, Translator, Scientist, Spy 
  On the surface, Peter Hoong-Yee Lee would likely not be cast as the male lead of 
a Hollywood spy thriller. As a quiet and unassuming scientist, Lee had no military or 
espionage training, but was a highly skilled researcher who excelled in the field of 
inertial confinement fusion (ICF) of nuclear weapons.279 Lee’s father had been a general 
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in the Chinese Nationalist Army that was eventually driven out by Mao Zedong.280 
Having grown up in Taiwan, Lee attended the National Taiwan University and then later 
moved to the United States, where he became a naturalized citizen in 1975.281 After 
graduation, Lee obtained an ICF research contract with Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (Livermore) through TRW Inc. in California.282 Lee’s aptitude for nuclear 
research soon earned him a position as the head of a laser research team at Livermore. In 
1980, Lee returned to China, acting as a translator for a team of Livermore scientists. 
During this stay, a Chinese scientist came to Lee’s hotel room one night. Although he 
didn’t share many details, Lee did mention the meeting to a coworker. The coworker, 
aware of the company’s security policy, promptly reported the impromptu meeting to 
Livermore security when they returned to the United States.283 Notably, Lee failed to 
report the incident to security and began a decades-long overtly social and covertly 
intelligence-based exchange with China that would lead to an FBI investigation and 
eventual prosecution.  
Along with his wife this time, Lee quickly returned to China after this initial visit, 
spending five weeks in December 1981 and January 1982 working at the Shanghai 
Institute of Optics and Lasers. Seeing the deplorable conditions of the Chinese lab in 
comparison to what the United States had, Lee sought to improve the conditions in China. 
A fellow scientist who assisted in the later investigation of Lee said that while Lee was in 
Shanghai, “he fell in love with the history and the art, the mystique.”284 On one of these 
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early trips to China, Lee met Chen Neng Kuan, who was an explosives researcher who 
served as a host for China’s high value American intelligence targets, which would at one 
point include Los Alamos Laboratory director Harold Agnew. After meeting Chen, Lee 
began a sixteen-year relationship with Chinese intelligence, captured in correspondence 
with Chinese scientists which consisted of over six hundred phone calls, letters, and 
emails.285  
In 1984, Lee began working at Los Alamos Laboratory as he continued his 
regular visits to the Chinese mainland. In 1985, on a solo trip to a nuclear weapons 
research center in Mianyang, Lee was visited in his hotel room again, this time by Chen. 
Calmly and deftly, Chen began asking Lee a series of questions that delved into classified 
information.286 Lee was initially hesitant, but after Chen emphasized the deplorable 
conditions of China’s nuclear research facilities and how Lee could simply nod ‘yes’ or 
‘no,’ to his questions, Lee relented and began answering first with nods and then with full 
sentences. The next day, Lee was taken to another hotel room, this time filled with 
Chinese weapons scientists who asked similarly sensitive questions for hours, which were 
promptly answered by Lee.287  
If the relationship had teetered between professional and clandestine before, in the 
second hotel room, surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, there was no question 
that China had effectively converted Lee from an eager acquaintance to a fully-fledged 
spy. 
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Around 1985, the FBI opened an espionage investigation and received approval 
for electronic surveillance of Lee.288 For years, nothing substantive materialized, but in 
1997, after returning home from China, Lee’s wife discovered an FBI microphone in a 
ceiling vent while she was dusting. The FBI was now aware that their covert recordings 
were compromised, so they requested to interview Lee in a Santa Barbara hotel. 
Eventually, Lee admitted to sharing national defense information with China for more 
than a decade. Lee also stated that his motivations stemmed largely from a desire to 
please his father, from personal insecurity, and from what Lee’s attorney called 
“scientific enthusiasm.”289 Although government inquiries later questioned the FBI and 
Department of Justice’s prosecution of Peter Lee, his agent recruitment process serves as 
a prototypical example of China’s HUMINT modus operandi.290  
Case Study #2: Kevin Mallory: Former Case Officer Seeking Current Employment 
A case study illustrating China’s evolved agent recruitment techniques is the 
successful recruitment of Kevin Mallory. In 2017, it was discovered that Mallory, a 
former CIA case officer and fluent Mandarin speaker, had been spotted, assessed, and 
ultimately recruited by Chinese Intelligence via the professional networking site 
LinkedIn.291  
Prior to his recruitment, Mallory held officer positions at the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), both of which granted him 
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top-secret security clearances.292 Mallory left government employment in 2012, and by 
2017, he was purportedly behind on his mortgage payments, making him financially 
vulnerable and a prime target for a benefits-based recruitment.293  
China’s contact with Mallory was initiated via LinkedIn in February 2017 by 
someone who Mallory said appeared to be a headhunter (later revealed to be an 
individual by the name of Michael Yang) offering him a job as a consultant for a Chinese 
think tank.294 An FBI affidavit listed the think tank as the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences ("SASS").295 Also included in the same affidavit was the FBI’s assessment that 
“the Shanghai State Security Bureau ("SSSB"), a sub-component of the Ministry of State 
Security ("MSS"), has a close relationship with SASS and uses SASS employees as 
spotters and assessors. The FBI has further assessed that SSSB intelligence officers have 
also used SASS affiliation as cover identities.”296  
Several LinkedIn messages later, Yang, still posing as a headhunter, arranged a 
phone call with Mallory and an employee of the think tank.297 Mallory made two trips to 
China in 2017 and at one point, agreed to meet with three men in a hotel room. Once 
inside the hotel suite in Shanghai, Mallory was questioned about the Trump 
administration’s foreign policy, probed for details on the THAAD missile system, and 
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asked about the United States’ posture towards the South China Sea.298 On the second of 
his two trips to China in the Spring of 2017, Mallory was given a specially configured 
Samsung Galaxy phone with an encrypted chat application which he used to 
communicate with Yang.299 The FBI was able to recover these conversations and uncover 
details of the source-handler relationship between Mallory and Yang. Yang appeared to 
press Mallory for more information that could be of use, while emphasizing his focus on 
Mallory’s safety. Mallory, on the other hand, seemed to be pressing Yang for higher 
financial compensation, given the risk he was running by providing these documents.300 
Additional FBI forensic analysis of the phone and its contents revealed that Mallory had 
completed all of the required steps for transmitting at least five classified government 
documents, one of which contained personally identifiable information of US 
government human sources. At least two of the documents were transmitted and 
communications between Mallory and Yang about these two documents were later 
captured off of the device. 
Mallory surmised that his Chinese contacts were intelligence officers, but 
nevertheless, he persisted in providing them with what was determined by an FBI 
investigation to be classified documents. At his trial, it was revealed that Mallory had 
sent Yang at least two documents, including one which outlined a proposed DIA 
undercover operation.301  
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Although many of the details of the proposed operation were redacted, court 
testimony indicated that the operation would have involved Mallory using non-official 
cover at a company with a presence in China, but whose owners (labeled in court as “the 
Johnsons”) were already cooperating with the U.S. government. Mallory’s objective 
would have been to gather intelligence on science and technology. Court witness Robert 
Ambrose who oversaw undercover operations at the DIA testified that a modified version 
of this plan did go forward. However, in 2011, Mallory was let go from the DIA after he 
shared details of the proposed operation with a private intelligence contractor. Court 
records show that the Johnsons communicated with Mallory via LinkedIn in 2017, 
sharing that they no longer had business in China.302 Hugh Michael Higgins, another 
former DIA employee who oversaw operations, said that this communication as the 
Johnsons’ former handler was a major breach.303 
Mallory was arrested upon his second return from Shanghai when customs agents 
found $16,500 of undeclared cash on his person.304 
A total amount of $25,000 was reportedly what Mallory received in exchange for 
providing classified documents.305 At his espionage trial in 2018, jurors saw these 
documents, in addition to other classified documents pertaining to defense intelligence 
operations and CIA intelligence analysis regarding another country’s intelligence 
capabilities which Mallory had loaded onto SD cards.306 Trial evidence included video 
footage of Mallory scanning top-secret and secret documents at a FedEx store and then 
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loading the documents onto SD cards. Court records also detailed Mallory’s precarious 
financial situation, demonstrating how he had $12,205.32 past due on his mortgage 
payments, a credit card debt of $30,000, and a balance of more than $200,000 on a home 
equity line of credit.307 
In June 2018, Mallory was found guilty of conspiracy to deliver, attempted 
delivery, actual delivery of national defense information to aid a foreign government and 
making materially false statements.308 In May 2019, Mallory was sentenced to twenty 
years in prison followed by five years of supervised release.309 
Case Study Analysis 
As illustrated by both cases, China’s spotting and assessing phases of agent 
recruitment often begin as innocent encounters, bereft of what many foreign intelligence 
agencies would deem sophisticated tradecraft. There are no dead drops, no high-speed 
surveillance and no cocktail parties; simply one professional reaching out to another, with 
a tacit expectation of a deeper relationship. Likewise, the Chinese intelligence 
recruitment and handling phases take place along the same relational spectrum of 
business or research with a sprinkling of positive cultural exchange. However, there are 
several key facets of social media’s technology that have significantly altered this process 
and are worth exploring more deeply.  
Spotting in Social Media 
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 Like many intelligence targets, the target of the first case study, Peter Lee, was 
most likely a target of opportunity. Once any initial reticence on his part was eradicated, 
the Chinese took advantage of his cooperation and invited him time and time again back 
to China, pulling him deeper into a mutually beneficial exchange of financial gifts for 
intelligence. Like many intelligence targets, Lee was not likely not verified as an 
intelligence target upon his first, second, or third visit to the foreign intelligence service’s 
country. Intelligence recruitments and approaches always carry a degree of risk and 
uncertainty, even when they occur in one’s home country. To this day, China receives 
many ethnic Chinese like Lee as visitors, who may be potential intelligence targets, but 
unlike the Cold War, today’s technology enables nations like China to perform much of 
their spotting beforehand. Prior to the advent of social media, spotting a particular target 
on the world’s professional stage was a far more difficult task. 
As evidenced by the Mallory case, the spotting phase of agent recruitment is made 
infinitely easier with the advent of social media and the richly detailed profiles that 
accompany it. On LinkedIn, users are given reminders of the percentage of completeness 
of their profiles. LinkedIn provides positive feedback to users who opt to share a wide 
range of personal information and provides negative feedback (in the form of pop-ups 
and email reminders) to users who decline to share such details. LinkedIn is particularly 
cognizant of users who choose to omit a profile picture and will routinely ask users for 
the reasoning behind this omittance. For the modern Chinese intelligence officer, 
LinkedIn’s digital culture of encouraged openness provides a highly accessible data set of 
potential intelligence targets.  
Assessing in Social Media 
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 Similar to spotting through social media, assessing targets is far easier in social 
media, as sites like LinkedIn allow users to search profiles based upon a wide variety of 
characteristics, enabling would-be handlers to sort and filter profiles based on desired 
skill sets and professional experience. Additionally, LinkedIn allows users to export 
profiles in various file formats, furthering the portability and ease of information sorting 
afforded by social media. 
 While Chinese operatives likely assessed Lee over the course of several carefully 
orchestrated visits to the Chinese mainland, it requires far fewer resources to assess a 
modern-day target like Mallory.  
Recruiting in Social Media 
Although it is not the only professional networking site, LinkedIn stands alone in 
terms of market share. Because LinkedIn is engineered for legitimate job recruiters, it 
takes very little effort for any individual to find someone who possesses a very specific 
set of skills and experience. Within the digital confines of LinkedIn, there also lies a high 
degree of privacy, making it ideal for employees who want to clandestinely seek 
additional job opportunities, or defect to a foreign nation.  
In contrast to the overt, hotel room approach used by Chinese intelligence against 
Peter Lee, the approach of Mallory was more private, more innocuous, and more routine 
than someone claiming to have job opportunities entering Mallory’s bedroom. The 
paradoxical intimacy and distance afforded in social media makes contact from strangers 
seem normal and likewise, more innocent than the physical approaches of the Cold War. 
Additionally, the air of legitimacy afforded by LinkedIn presents unique 
challenges for monitoring espionage, deception operations, and human recruitment 
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efforts. Unlike the legions of faceless bots generated by Russia’s Internet Research 
Agency, the legions of Chinese HUMINT recruiters are flesh and blood. They have 
backstories, legends, and outside lives that any social network’s algorithms would not 
immediately label as a threat to its users. Because the modern Chinese agent recruitment 
threat is a complex hybrid of traditional HUMINT techniques and modern affordances of 
the digital sphere, it presents an ongoing challenge for Western intelligence agencies. 
Conclusion 
 From this examination of Chinese agent recruitment in social media, it is clear 
that China’s modern cyber operations are not focused solely on probing America’s 
critical infrastructure and stealing its intellectual property. In terms of cyber tools, as this 
chapter has shown, the relatively ‘soft’ vector of social media appears to be a valuable 
new vector for intelligence recruitments, and as such, it should not be overlooked as a 
serious counterintelligence concern. As more and more Chinese intelligence officers 
infiltrate social media networks, it is critical that researchers from the public and private 
sectors are aware of the historical driving forces behind these events. This chapter 
intended to illuminate the history behind China’s increasingly aggressive actions to 
recruit current and former U.S. intelligence officers. The recent prosecution and 
sentencing of Kevin Mallory demonstrate America’s ability to investigate espionage. 
However, more efforts could be put towards the prevention of this form of Chinese 
recruitment before it starts.   
 One notable aspect of this problem, which differentiates its solution from that of 
Cold War espionage, is that much of the pertinent data that can assist intelligence 
analysts, academic researchers and policymakers, is currently held by private companies. 
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Because of this fact, future lines of research should be approached with public and 
private sector cooperation. With input from both intelligence professionals and private 
sector stakeholders, social media developers can build robust platforms that can detect or 
prevent foreign interference. As the 9/11 Commission Report demonstrated, successful 
defense of the nation is not secured through bureaucratic stove-piping, but the concerted 
collaboration of public and private sector professionals.310 
Future research into this area should continue to monitor developments in the 
tradecraft of Chinese recruitment efforts in social media, paying particular attention to the 
tactics, techniques and procedures which mirror those that China has used for centuries. 
If private and public sector experts possess a more holistic understanding of how the 
Chinese intelligence threat has historically evolved, then media analysts can better spot 
and assess future threats of Chinese agent recruitment for the benefit of policymakers, 
analysts, and U.S. security officials. 
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Conclusion  
The United States has often been able to anticipate future threats posed by foreign 
intelligence agencies. For much of American history, astronomical defense budgets and a 
robust intelligence bureaucracy have supplied the necessary technological and workforce 
advantages to accomplish this. With the advent of social media however, there has been 
an expansion of the intelligence playing field. With all the world’s terrorists, spies and 
criminals gathered on the Internet, the possibilities for covert influence, data theft and 
espionage grows by the day. Information that was formerly confined to encrypted cables 
and invisible ink now travels at the speed of light through social media networks on a 
daily basis. Yet, much of social media’s affordances have not altered the central goals, 
covert techniques and classical tradecraft of foreign intelligence agencies.  
 This paper sought to find out which classical intelligence techniques are used by 
America’s most prominent intelligence adversaries in the sphere of social media. As 
discussed in the previous three chapters, the nations of Russia, Iran and China have all 
demonstrated a willingness and capability to revive specific intelligence techniques and 
direct these techniques against the United States through the vector of social media. This 
chapter will highlight key findings and conclusions from the previous chapters, make 
recommendations for addressing the issues discussed in this paper, and then make 
suggestions for future research on this topic.  
Key Findings and Conclusions 
As explored in Chapter 1, Russia has proven to be one of the most brazen US 
intelligence adversaries in the twenty-first century. However, in spite of its brazenness 
and lengthy history of engagement, Russian intelligence has had a mixed record of 
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operational success. Even at the height of the Cold War, Soviet attempts to influence 
American elections were often hindered by the limited technological tools available to 
propagate covert influence materials. In 1984, the KGB launched one of its most 
ambitious covert influence campaigns to date, in an effort to kick incumbent president 
Ronald Reagan out of the White House. The KGB did this by producing scores of 
inflammatory pamphlets and ephemera and by specifically tasking all of its officers with 
carrying out ‘active measures.’ As evidenced by Reagan’s sweeping reelection victory, 
this KGB covert influence operation failed to achieve its stated goals and left Ronald 
Reagan unscathed in the eyes of American voters.  
Though not every mission was a success, all throughout the Cold War the Soviet 
Union made it no secret that the United States was its number one intelligence enemy, 
and many researchers argue that this threat prioritization still stands.311 While America 
may always be Russia’s number one enemy, during the immediate period following the 
Cold War, Russia’s intelligence agencies underwent years of internal political and 
bureaucratic reorganization, which put many of their intelligence operations on a 
temporary hiatus. After President Putin took office, Russia slowly rebuilt its intricate 
intelligence networks and recently extended these networks into the realm of social 
media. 
This paper found that within the realm of social media Russia has revived the 
classical intelligence techniques of kompromat, forgeries, front groups and agents of 
influence and directed these techniques towards American presidential elections. While 
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the core tenets of these techniques remain, two critical aspects of Russia’s covert 
influence toolbox have been enhanced through social media.  
First, Russia’s ability to obfuscate its involvement in spreading digital forgeries 
has improved. Influencing from the shadows has always been where Russia’s spies have 
felt most at home. While most countries wait to attack their adversaries when they can 
see the whites of their eyes, Russia is notorious for attacking its enemies from a distance 
and then denying any and all involvement in the malicious activity.312 Russia’s inherent 
tendency and social media’s ability to hide one’s identity have only enhanced Russia’s 
modern effectiveness in the intelligence realm. Secondly, social media has worsened 
Americans’ ability to discern the truth in modernity’s digital mire of misinformation. As 
many communications studies have shown, several aspects of human information 
processing become stunted when humans interact with digital media. Without the aid of 
source cues such as nonverbal body language and direct eye contact, many social media 
users make decisions based purely in emotion when it comes to deciphering digital 
content. On the whole, the only conclusion that can be drawn at this point in time, is that 
constant vigilance is required by every government, social media provider and digital 
citizen in order to constantly untangle the socially disruptive wires held together by 
falsely concocted kompromat, front groups, forgeries, and agents of influence. 
In Chapter 2, this paper explored the expanding cyber operations of Iran and how 
social media plays no small part in acquiring and manipulating targets for Iranian honey 
trap operations. Following the launch of Stuxnet in 2010, Iran’s cyber and intelligence 
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forces awakened to the digital age and bolstered their cyber defensive and offensive 
resources. In the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community 
the US Director of National Intelligence writes that Iran is now a veritable opponent 
within the fifth domain of cyber operations and specifically, that Iran also “uses social 
media platforms to target US and allied audiences.”313 
While several of Iran’s cyber operations are worthy of study, this paper found that 
Iran’s deployment of honey traps in social media should be of grave concern to US 
intelligence. In early 2017, Iranian intelligence operations unleashed a demure yet deadly 
force multiplier in the form of digital persona, Mia Ash. Claiming to be a single, female 
photographer based in London, Mia Ash was a classic example of a honey trap made 
digital. While she appeared friendly to her victims, she was nothing more than a series of 
pillaged online profiles pasted together by Iranian intelligence operatives in order to lure 
unassuming victims in the oil, gas and aerospace industries and infect their computer 
systems with remote access malware. Simultaneously, the components of another Iranian 
honey trap operation were coalescing. In 2012, as US Air Force employee and Iranian 
defector Monica Witt attended anti-American conferences in Tehran she was being lured 
into her own Iranian trap when she refused to heed repeated warnings from the FBI that 
Iranian intelligence was targeting her. In or around 2013, Witt officially defected and 
became a spy for Iran and began years of valuable service to Iranian intelligence. Using 
her knowledge of former colleagues, Witt assumed various false identities in social media 
networks, quietly assessing and delivering digital targets into the hands of her Iranian 
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handlers. After generating this initial contact, Witt’s co-conspirators sent malicious links 
and attachments which downloaded malware onto the machines of Witt’s social media 
contacts, which logged their keystrokes and maintained persistent access to their 
computer and associated network.  
After closely examining the intelligence techniques used in the case studies of 
Iran’s ‘Mia Ash’ persona and Iran’s use of American defector Monica Witt, it is clear that 
Iran is incorporating the traditional honey trap technique into its computer network 
exploitation operations (CNE). While CNE operations may involve multi-phase 
execution and millions of lines of code, Chapter 2’s analysis shows that Iran’s initial 
vector of cyberattack relies on more traditional and human-centric vectors which mirror 
the mechanisms of the Soviet Union’s ‘swallows’ and ‘Romeo spies.’  
Although Iran’s digital honey trap operations do not directly target nearly as many 
individuals as Russia’s one-hundred-million-views Facebook campaigns, Iran has 
damaged US national security and obtained intelligence successes by focusing its efforts 
on select groups of high-value targets. Not every nation has the workforce and funding of 
Russia or China. What Iran lacks in numbers of officers, it provides in the persistence of 
its cyber operators and in the careful cultivation of its human sources, like Monica Witt.  
In the case of Mia Ash, though her identity was ultimately dismantled, she left a 
path of destruction in her wake. With no mechanisms built within social media’s 
platforms to prove or disprove her true existence, she coached various targets into 
downloading malicious attachments which gave persistent computer access to Iran’s 
cyber cadre. One of the key benefits to using a purely digital persona like Ash, is the fact 
that once her identity was burned, her digital footprint could be quickly erased, and a new 
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persona could be launched within seconds. No lives or livelihoods of female intelligence 
operatives were lost in the process which allows Iran to continue pilfering the Internet for 
lonely hearts and lucrative secrets. 
When Monica Witt first visited Iran and expressed an overt interest in its culture, 
Iranian intelligence officers wasted no time in training and developing her as a human 
source. Their investment proved to be invaluable when Witt began accepting taskings 
from Iran and turning on her former US Air Force colleagues. The Witt case study 
demonstrates that modern social media honey traps are not confined to purely digital 
personas. The Monica Witt case is a perfect example of a hybrid honey trap operation in 
which an American defector serves as the controller behind any number of real or fake 
digital personas. Through hybrid honey traps such as Witt, America’s adversaries are 
constantly reinventing their social media operations, derailing US national security and 
threatening America’s most vital human assets. 
Chapter 3 explored Chinese intelligence operations in social media. Specifically, 
this chapter explored China’s use of the intelligence technique of agent recruitment and 
how both personal desperation and financial struggles can lead both ethnic Chinese and 
Americans to divulge secrets to Chinese Intelligence. Instead of leveraging friendly or 
purely social relationships (like Iran’s Mia Ash and Bella Wood personas) the Chinese 
often leverage professional relationships. Over time, these professional relationships 
morph into a covert relationship which ultimately leads Chinese assets to violate non-
disclosure agreements and pass valuable US intelligence onto their Chinese handlers.  
Prior to social media, the Chinese targeted Peter ‘Wen-Ho’ Lee and used his 
scientific research as a grappling hook into his professional life. By offering Lee 
 107 
professional research opportunities and speaking engagements, the Chinese lured Lee to 
China’s mainland, where they exercised a high degree of control over his personal 
loyalties and persuaded him to help China in its race to beat the Americans in scientific 
innovation. This recruitment was bolstered by Lee’s cultural and familial ties to China, 
but ultimately succeeded through the strong establishment of professional rapport through 
consecutive physical meetings and an intelligence recruitment in-person.  
Kevin Mallory, on the other hand, was a former CIA case officer and financially 
plagued individual who was targeted through the online resume repository and 
professional networking site, LinkedIn. If Mallory had any initial hesitation, this was 
quickly quashed as the relationship moved from the digital world to the real one. 
However, even after meeting his handler in-person, the digital tradecraft between Mallory 
and his Chinese intelligence contacts continued when Mallory was assigned a specially 
configured phone which was likely encrypted in some form, so as to keep any further 
communications secret. Due to lapses in tradecraft, Mallory’s phone and its contents were 
discovered by the FBI. The phone, along with a slew of secret conversations between an 
asset and his handlers were ultimately uncovered and added to the pile of evidence 
against Mallory. What is most notable about the Mallory and Lee cases, is the speed with 
which the clandestine relationship developed in both cases. While Lee appears to have 
been developed for roughly five years, between 1980 and 1985 before agreeing to work 
for China in a covert capacity, Mallory’s recruitment progressed more quickly and with 
far fewer trips across oceans.  
As seen in the case studies, the valuable vector of social media has proven to be 
highly effective when it comes to covertly targeting and approaching Americans 
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individually, in small groups, and in swaths upwards of hundreds of millions. China often 
prefers to target people individually after sifting through their background and creating 
the perfect opportunity to get them to agree to a second meeting and ultimately, to agree 
to provide sensitive information. Iran often targets victims who work with sensitive 
technologies, going after IT managers or other individuals who may fall prey to alluring 
online personas who steal victim’s data or gain access to their networks. Russia possesses 
what is arguably the broadest target set. America’s Eurasian adversary seeks to influence 
entire populations in order to ideologically rip apart America’s citizens and cause 
divisions which distract Americans from recognizing who the true enemy is. 
Apart from the differences in techniques which exist amongst America’s 
intelligence adversaries, there are several aspects of social media which benefit them all. 
Namely, the covert, instantaneous and overexposed, yet simultaneously private nature of 
social media seems to broadly benefit intelligence operations as a whole. Although 
physical approaches of intelligence targets will likely continue within the diplomatic 
circuit, at professional conferences and anywhere else a valued target may be found, 
social media has created a less risky venue for intelligence agencies to initially approach 
and engage with human targets. 
While civilians may use social media to conceal communications from a spouse, a 
supervisor or any number of social acquaintances, all of America’s intelligence 
adversaries use social media tools to conceal their true identities from their targets and to 
hide their intelligence affiliation. They also use social media’s encryption and automatic 
delete features to facilitate secure communication with targets as in the case of Kevin 
Mallory. Even if the content of communications is uncovered, the exact location of guilty 
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interlocutors has never been easier to hide or misattribute. Through the use of non-static 
IP addresses and virtual private networks, fake digital personas can hide in a sea of 
privately held big data which often requires specialized technical expertise to decipher. 
Apart from the concealment advantages of social media as an intelligence 
operations platform, another value of this platform lies in its instantaneous dissemination 
capabilities. Through direct messaging applications, information can be passed across 
international borders within seconds. Meaningful relationships between digital honey 
traps and their targets can blossom without either party ever driving, flying or walking to 
meet each other. A million illicit messages can traverse the Internet without ever being 
seen by another soul.  
The final aspect of social media which makes it ideal for carrying out long-term 
intelligence operations is the fact that privacy in social media is an ill-defined concept 
with only patchwork regulation across the world. Many companies vow to keep customer 
information private, yet many fail to elaborate regarding what their internal privacy 
practices entail. Because intelligence agencies benefit from large budgets and 
technological experts, they can easily gain unauthorized access to vast troves of private 
information about individuals. Information which was formerly shared with a small 
subset of physically proximate individuals is now readily shared with social media 
providers and then pilfered by foreign intelligence agencies. Given the diverse forms of 
information safe-guarding within social media, this has sometimes resulted in significant 
data breaches and cases of espionage, like the recent case of two former Twitter 
employees charged with probing Twitter’s internal records for information on Saudi 
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dissidents and thousands of Twitter users on behalf of Saudi Arabia.314 The often 
unregulated and easily penetrable aspects of privacy in social media makes targeting 
individuals far easier, as their pattern of life and personal preferences are readily 
accessible by intelligence officers.   
General Recommendations 
The threat of intelligence operations in social media presents a persistent problem 
for American citizens, the US Intelligence Community and social media providers, the 
latter of whom are often reluctant to take action out of fear of alienating their customers. 
Although the current state of affairs in social media can seem like a harsh reality, there 
are steps which the US Intelligence Community and social media providers can take, in 
order to create a safer, more secure digital world. Four recommendations for mitigating 
the threat of foreign intelligence in social media include: educating Americans on the 
threat, implementing security by design protocols in social media platforms, creating 
identity verification mechanisms, and improving private and public sector information 
sharing. 
First, in order to fight forgeries, social media companies, nonprofit organizations 
and the US government can all produce public service announcements (PSAs) to better 
educate Americans in digital literacy and specifically, the importance of verifying 
information provenance in social media. Apart from emphasizing the need to verify 
information, PSAs could also educate Americans on verifying identities of people they 
connect with through social media. This could help victims determine agents of influence 
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and expose front groups. In terms of countering kompromat, PSAs could urge Americans 
to be careful regarding what they post publicly. Additionally, since many kompromat 
operations involve false information, PSAs should encourage social media users to think 
before reposting or retweeting information which not be true.  
Second, apart from educating social media users, social media and information 
technology providers can try to implement ‘security by design,’ which Facebook 
implemented to some extent after the 2016 US Presidential Election.315 Security by 
design is a proactive approach to infrastructure security — one that does not rely on 
reactive third party security tools which only respond to individual incidents, but rather, 
builds security into infrastructure from the ground up.316 Public and private sector 
cooperation in this matter could assist social media developers with identifying digital 
indicators of foreign intelligence activity on their platforms and could assist the public 
sector by providing a streamlined early warning system for suspected covert influence 
campaigns before they persist for months undetected. 
Third, better identity verification mechanisms should be put in place within social 
media. Before any technical solutions are developed, it is important for intelligence 
professionals, CEOs and citizens to note that the success of most of the intelligence 
operations discussed in this paper can be attributed to the lack of consistent and reliable 
identity verification mechanisms in social media. All social media users should make an 
effort to verify their online contacts, but when heightened security awareness is sacrificed 
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for convenience or expediency, social media users will likely not take the time to perform 
extensive background research of newly developed online contacts. If the victims of the 
Mia Ash operation had means to verify or corroborate the Mia Ash identity within the 
platforms in which she was operating then the malware unleashed by Mia Ash could have 
been contained. It is particularly imperative that public and private sector executives are 
aware of any and all tools which can assist in verifying the identities within their social 
media circles. As these types of individuals are the most likely to be targeted for 
proprietary or closely held information, executive briefings on digital verification 
mechanism could help to curb the number of successful online approaches of top 
executives and clearance holders.  
Fourth, it is important that US intelligence leaders address the lack of information 
sharing and overall communication between private sector stakeholders and the 
Intelligence Community. Hurdles to public-private sector cooperation abound in a variety 
of fields, but particularly within the field of intelligence. This is because espionage and 
counterintelligence investigations are often highly classified, compartmentalized and 
closely guarded by those who work these types of cases, and often for good reason. 
unfortunately, over-classification within the US government can also present information 
sharing hurdles which has been one of many critiques put forth by many leading 
researchers.317 These kinds of hurdles make public and private sector information sharing 
difficult but not insurmountable. Ways in which the public sector can facilitate 
information sharing is through publishing of unclassified white papers, granting 
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clearances to qualified private sector partners and de-classifying as much material as is 
practicable.  
However, successful sharing of information and collaboration in this field 
requires actions from both sides. The private sector can assist by funding projects which 
seek to detect deception operations in social media. Technology researchers in corporate 
America and American universities are perpetually making strides in artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning algorithms that are designed to detect certain 
patterns of behavior. Research which combines the fields of intelligence studies and AI 
could assist the Intelligence Community in identifying potential espionage cases in real 
time and real social networks.  
A blatant hurdle to this kind of data collection and information sharing is the 
potential for privacy violations. Social media currently exists in a patchwork of privatized 
corporations, each with their own user agreements and privacy policies. Although the 
2016 US Presidential Election called attention to the lack of defenses against foreign 
interference, many Americans are often wary of corporate interference and over-
collection of private data. Therefore, this kind of data sharing would have to be carefully 
scrutinized for First and Fourth Amendment considerations, as well as politicization 
concerns.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Although this paper provides historical and cultural context regarding the digital 
intelligence operations of America’s top intelligence adversaries, there are several lines 
of research which were not addressed and should be considered by future researchers. 
The first research recommendation of this paper is to broaden the cultural lens of 
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intelligence studies and analyze lesser known intelligence agencies in mainstream 
research. Just as history has informed this paper about classical intelligence techniques, 
history also has a lot to say about hidden intelligence alliances, with Russia’s Cold War 
assistance to Cuba and its former Soviet states being a prime example. Many current, but 
lesser known intelligence agencies are likely working with some or all of the agencies 
examined in the chapters above, but there is little research which attempts to make this 
kind of advanced attribution.  
Smaller intelligence adversaries certainly take action against the United States, 
but the lack of public attention on these lesser known adversaries has created a dearth of 
research regarding the nuances of their operations. North Korea and Israel are two 
examples of nations whose cyber operations are legion, yet they often remain hidden 
from the public eye. Additionally, in 2017, Cyber security firm FireEye officially 
designated APT32 aka ‘Ocean Lotus Group’ for executing intrusions into private sector 
companies, foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists.318 APT32 is a Vietnamese 
advanced persistent threat (APT) group whose socially engineered malware and 
espionage operations had been on the cyber firm’s radar since 2014 and whose activities 
continue to disrupt global politics and economics.319  
Intelligence studies has often been limited in terms of its cultural focus, with a 
great deal of research devoted to what some researchers have called the ‘Anglosphere.’320 
This has historically led to a severe lack of source diversity and richness. This paper 
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addressed this issue from an American perspective and highlighted three of America’s 
top intelligence adversaries. However, the United States is not the only country whose 
elections and national resources have been targeted for exploitation and Americans are 
not the only citizens who use social media. Germany, France and the UK have all 
experienced what their national security experts believe was foreign influence through 
social media. By examining the social media operations directed towards other nations, 
American researchers can learn from America’s allies and better understand foreign 
intelligence operations in social media from a global perspective.  
The second research recommendation of this paper is to address this topic from a 
technical standpoint and examine which intelligence tactics, techniques and procedures 
are platform specific. In other words, which forms of intelligence gathering take place on 
specific social media platforms? LinkedIn is a somewhat obvious platform for human 
agent recruitment since its stated purpose is for job recruitment. Among other, less well-
known social media sites, it would be valuable to explore the human recruitment aspects 
of each platform and how these platforms are specifically leveraged to perform specific 
types of intelligence collection. Every social media site claims to specialize in certain 
forms of human connection within digital media. Some sites, like Twitter are more text-
driven, while other sites like Instagram are geared more towards photo and video sharing. 
Future research could analyze the most popular social media sites from an intelligence  
perspective and report on the specific ways in which its users may be exploited by 
foreign intelligence adversaries. 
This kind of platform-specific research is already ongoing within the private 
sector. FireEye’s report on APT29 (HAMMERTOSS) explores how this Russian state-
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sponsored cyber group capitalizes on Twitter’s source code and a custom algorithm to 
generate random Twitter handles every day, which seek out specific high-value targets on 
the social media platform to inject command and control (CNC) malware.321 CNET has 
characterized this HAMMERTOSS as “essentially a first class spy” whose Twitter-
enabled malware “mimics normal computer user behavior the entire time it's 
compromising files on a victim's machine. It can even time itself to the victim's work 
schedule.”322 According to FireEye, other malicious tools that specifically weaponize 
Twitter, include: MiniDuke, a Windows-based backdoor that is a suspected Russian tool, 
the Sninfs botnet, and Flashback, which is a Mac-based backdoor.323 This form of 
platform-specific intelligence analysis is valuable to coders, intelligence professionals 
and all users of social media. Future research could expand threat analysis to other 
platforms and then publish results regarding the threats other platforms are most likely to 
face. 
The third research recommendation of this paper is to probe the interdisciplinary 
depths of deception research. Although deception theory has greatly expanded since the 
onset of computer mediated communication, much of social media territory remains to be 
explored. Future intelligence studies could include human psychology and 
communications research to conduct studies on topics such as the effects of introducing 
more robust visual source cues in social media, which hitherto have been sorely lacking 
in this digital communications medium. Analyzing whether source cues aid in online 
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deception detection could help social media providers in implementing better security 
measures for their users and in creating a more trustworthy online experience. Some 
intelligence researchers are taking cues from the history of honey pots and ‘sexpionage’ 
and are synthesizing intelligence and sexuality studies, to explore how online sexual 
behaviors affect modern intelligence operations.  
Much of modern intelligence collection still revolves around the collection of 
human intelligence, which should not be forgotten when analyzing comprehensive data 
sets provided by social media analytics tools. For this reason, it is imperative that future 
intelligence research acknowledges the human factor in its varying approaches. 
The Future Without Change 
If research and public discussion continues to label the threat of intelligence 
operations in social media purely as a modern technological challenge, then future 
elections, state secrets and economic proprietary information will continue to be stolen. 
From the research presented in this paper, is clear that foreign intelligence agencies are 
using social media not merely as an open source platform for collection, but as a meeting 
venue for initial introductions to intelligence targets. In this sense, social media has been 
used to supplement, rather than replace classical venues of intelligence activity. Although 
OSINT continues to expand the base of the intelligence analyst’s data sources, social 
media is particularly potent for its human factor and the direct human contact which 
occurs on its platforms.  
This paper’s analysis of specific classical intelligence techniques that have been 
revived in social media demonstrates a small portion of the tradecraft paradigm shift 
which is taking place within the intelligence profession. What once required large sums 
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of money, a lifetime of cultural knowledge and highly trained intelligence officers is now 
accomplished through encryption algorithms, data servers and digital bots. Although 
many private sector and academic researchers are well versed in the modern technologies 
behind today’s intelligence operations in social media, there are few cyber experts who 
also possess a deep understanding the histories, cultures and motivations of America’s 
intelligence adversaries. Because intelligence operations in social media are causing 
some of the most damaging incidents in recent American history, it is imperative that all 
researchers synthesize historical insights, current technology and forward-looking 
analysis to better understand and combat this issue.  
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